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Abstract
To achieve the net-zero carbon dioxide emissions goal, the penetration rate of
distributed energy resources has been increasing in modern power distribution net-
works for the past decade. Although these energy resources are environmentally
friendly, they raise challenges for distribution network protection. Distribution
networks are typically designed based on the single power flow direction principle,
where power is flowing from the substation transformer to the load following a
tree-like topology. In this way, power lines that are closer to the substation may
have higher current flows. For distribution network feeder protection, particu-
larly overcurrent relays, coordination is achieved based on the above principle,
such that the downstream power lines closer to the fault have equal or higher
level of fault currents compared to the upstream power lines.
With distributed energy resources, the distribution network can work in ei-
ther grid connected mode as is most common or islanded mode as in emerging
microgrids. This indicates that the electrical topology of the distribution network
can be changed in real time. Moreover, when a fault happens, the downstream
relay can see higher level of fault current compared to the upstream relay, causing
malfunctions of the relay, such as blinding or sympathetic tripping.
The main focus of this thesis is on the development and the implementation of
a new current tracing decomposition method to address the above issues. Specif-
ically, a very detailed grid model is proposed, which has sufficient information
of the current flows both from each distributed energy source to the power lines
and between each distributed energy source and loads.
With the results of the current flow information from the current tracing
method, this research highlights the implementation of machine learning for fault
xvii
current identification. Specifically, the current tracing method is taken as the
kernel function that can be used to improve the performance of the support vector
machine for the detection of low level faults that may be below the sensitivity of
conventional overcurrent relays in the presence of DERs.
This research also highlights the implementation of the new current tracing
method on primary and backup protection schemes in distribution feeders. Specif-
ically, decomposed currents are used as a substitute of the measurement currents
to better coordinate the upstream and downstream relays. To demonstrate the
effectiveness of the proposed method, the current tracing method is implemented
in a Matlab-Simulink platform and imported to EMTP-MATLAB simulation in-
terface. The simulation results show that using the decomposed current can
improve the sensitivity and dependability of primary and backup protection in
the presence of multiple DERs. It can also address the issue of protection relay




The past few decades have witnessed a growing number of distributed energy re-
sources (DER) penetrating into the customer side, which has caused distribution
grids to evolve into large, complex and interconnected networks. While these
changes have made positive impacts to the sustainability of energy and helped
in reducing the emission of greenhouse gases, they also present new challenges to
the protection of distribution networks that have been working stably for more
than 100 years.
One of the major challenges caused by the penetration of DERs into electricity
grids is that, although the geographic topology of the power system is not chang-
ing, the electrical topology is changing dynamically due to the irregular changing
of the DERs power injection. For example, the distribution network which op-
erates under the current topology may switch to the other topologies due to the
operating conditions and performance requirements. These complex electrical
typologies are often not fixed, but subject to different factors such as environ-
ment and weather, for example, hot temperature, thunder storm, sleet storm, etc.
Customer habits can also contribute to the topology change [1]. Such dynamic
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change of distribution networks’ topology disrupts the normally designed protec-
tion relay tripping sequence in feeders where the topology is unknown for each
individual relay with limited local metering information.
At the other end of the spectrum, the conventional relay coordination strategy
is designed to accommodate the traditional distribution networks which originally
was intended to support feeder overcurrent protection for single direction power
flow from the upstream substation to the downstream customer. With the rising
amount of distributed and intermittent DERs, bidirectional power flow is intro-
duced to the distribution networks. Currents may flow in either direction at any
time. In addition, the current magnitude is also affected by the injection of DERs.
This increases the likelihood of disrupting the protection relay tripping sequence
as the upstream usually requires higher tripping current thresholds and longer
time delays for backup coordination with downstream protection elements.
The accepted approach of feeder protection schemes is to isolate only the
faulty sections, while leaving the majority of the healthy parts of the network still
functioning. Investigating protection schemes in such complex networks requires
a strong understanding of the interaction of different irregular and intermittent
DERs through the dynamically changed distribution grids topology.
Given the requirement of designing protection schemes described above, the
overarching goals of this thesis are initially to estimate the distribution networks’
topology in real time considering the individual DER source and substation inter-
active contributions to the fault current. With the estimated topology informa-
tion, a very detailed current tracing model is developed to decompose the current
flow between different DERs and loads connected through the same power line.
As a result, each protection relay on the distribution feeder typically has the
information of current magnitude flowing between these DERs and loads. Pro-
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tection schemes are then devised based on the newly proposed decomposed traced
current flow information.
1.1 Motivation
The impact of DERs to the distribution grids has received a fair amount of atten-
tion in power system protection studies, especially in the aspect of bidirectional
power flow from DERs such as solar photovoltaic farms and rooftop panels. The
distribution network may also be reconfigured with sectional switches to modify
its topology for improving performance. For example, it has been shown that the
network may be reconfigured to cause the distribution transformers to electri-
cally be relocated more centrally with respect to the loads to prevent higher line
losses [2]. In addition, reverse power flow can lower the fault current detected by
the upstream current transformer (CT) and corresponding protection relay [3].
If a wire is shorted to ground in the right conditions of reverse power flow, the
protection system may not see the downed wire and so it remains in the ground
fully energized and a hazard to the public.
One other uncertainty is the contribution of the inverter based DERs to the
fault current. Due to the overload handling characteristic of inverters, for exam-
ple, the fault current limiter [4, 5] and blocking the inverter [6], currents coming
from DERs are much less than normal fault currents, but still contribute to the
fault. High penetration of inverters may cause issues of blinding of protection
relays from seeing a fault, sympathetic tripping for faults not within a relay’s
intended zone of operation, unintentional islanding and fuse-recloser miscoordi-
nation [7].
Reclosers, relays and other protection equipment may fail to protect distri-
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bution feeders against the above changes and need to be readjusted to handle
these changes [8, 9]. Proper planning and interconnection studies can provide an
alternative way to partly fix these issues [10, 11] before they become problems.
However, this is not practical for an already established distribution system where
the location of DERs is installed on an ad-hoc basis.
Most of these problems can be addressed or partly remedied only in a case
by case scenario. For example, the protection relay settings should be adjusted
every time the topology is changed or the reverse power flow happens [12]. How-
ever, stringent reliability standards and regulations make it difficult to change
protective relay settings easily and requires significant approval processes and
protection coordination checks. Different types of protection relays also apply to
particular schemes. The economics of the investment in protection system play
a significant factor, which in many cases even outweigh the capital costs of the
power being generated over the life of the generator.
Given the situation, a new general topological model which can accommodate
the impact caused by the variable injection of DERs to distribution grids is
proposed. This model should not only be easily integrated into different relays’
processing algorithms, but also establish the connection between these relays
while DERs are injected into the distribution network even though the DERs
contribution to the fault current is weak.
1.2 Objective of the Work
The thesis is mainly focused on developing advanced models for relay coordination
considering the impact of DERs on a distribution level power grid. Specifically,
the study concentrates on the over current relay coordination issue under the im-
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pact of DERs since the DERs may also contribute to the fault current. Thus the
main objective is to develop a method for identifying the contribution of DERs,
loads and the substation to different types of faults without additional relaying
measurement points. To achieve this objective, for the first time, a decomposi-
tional current tracing method is proposed for application in overcurrent feeder
protection relaying. This methods highlights the active and reactive current con-
tributions of DERs, loads and the substation on their connected distribution lines.
Therefore, in this research, one of the assumptions is that current, voltage and
line impedance meter data can be obtained in real time, which can be achieved
through the data concentrator system in wide area protection [13]. Once the
contribution of the fault current on the distribution line are traced through the
proposed method, the primary protection scheme of the distribution line can
be established by either setting up the tripping threshold of the fault current
contribution or using a machine learning method to identify the fault [14].
Another objective is in the area of backup protection scheme design. In this
research, the distribution networks’ topology is assumed to remained the same.
Thus, the over current relay coordination is mainly how the backup protection
relay reacts to the fault current when the primary protection relay fails to react
to the same fault in a fixed topology distribution feeder. The backup protection
scheme can be affected by higher penetration of DERs, causing problems like
blinding of protection and sympathetic tripping, etc. This is illustrated with and
without the proposed current tracing method. The application of current tracing
in solving the blinding of protection relays is the main focus of this thesis.
Further results of the application of current tracing method in protection
schemes are presented. These applications demonstrate the advantages of using
current tracing over traditional overcurrent relaying in distribution power system
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protection under the penetration of DERs.
This thesis is organized as follows: A literature review of current research in
the area of feeder protection is provided in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 describes the
known impacts of DERs to distribution networks protection. Chapter 4 describes
the theoretical development of the proposed current tracing method. Chapter 5
demonstrates simulation results of the proposed current tracing method applied
to distribution networks’ primary protection. Chapter 6 introduces the appli-
cation of current tracing method on distribution networks’ backup protection.
Conclusions are made in Chapter 7 along with future work.
1.3 Publications
Some results of this thesis have already been published and the details are given
below.
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pp. 1-6. IEEE, 2020.
[2] Fei, Wanghao, and Paul Moses. “Fault current tracing and identification via
machine learning considering distributed energy resources in distribution
networks.” Energies 12, no. 22 (2019): 4333.
[3] Fei, Wanghao, and Paul Moses. “Modeling power distribution grids through
current tracing method.” In 2019 IEEE 7th International Conference on
Smart Energy Grid Engineering (SEGE), pp. 196-200. IEEE, 2019.
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ing wave representation for propagation of energy transients in power lines
from a quantum perspective.” In 2018 North American Power Symposium
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Chapter 2




Power system protection has been an active research topic since the commercial-
ization of electricity. Previously, researchers have proposed many methods to
deal with various power system protection issues. In [15], a transmission line
distance protection scheme was proposed using the communication aided method
to mitigate the impact of series capacitor and adjacent lines such as the increased
voltage. A unit protection scheme was proposed using the superimposed current
for fault current detection [16]. This method provides improved performance for
DC micro grid protection. To speed up the tripping of the second zone protec-
tion of the distance relay, an accelerated trip scheme was proposed based on
the variations of the sequence currents and voltages caused by the faults [17].
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This method can increase the sensitivity, avoid improper operation and alleviate
the communication barrier. In [18], an overcurrent protection strategy was pro-
posed considering the impact of DERs and fault current limiters (FCLs). In this
method, each IED can calculate its own fault index, thus the fault location can
be identified following the decision tree.
Traveling wave based method is another way to deal with the protection
problem [19, 20, 21]. This method is proposed based on the fact that a fault
would generate traveling waves (current and voltage) that propagate from the
fault position to the busbar along the transmission line [22]. When the traveling
wave impedance changes, it will get reflected and refracted. If a reference point is
selected, the transient voltage and current could therefore be calculated according
to the telegraph equations [23].
Wide area protection is becoming a popular topic in the past decades. It is
used to save the system from a blackout or brownout when the system is in normal
operational conditions such that no particular equipment is faulted or operated
over its limitations[24]. The wide area protection is developed based on modern
sensors or transducers, for example phasor measurement units (PMUs), along
with a data concentrator [13], for example energy management system (EMS),
such that a system wide communication infrastructure is established as shown in
Fig. 2.1.
Such communication infrastructure is integrated with the traditional self con-
tained protection system which can obtain real-time synchronized measurement
data provided by GPS[13].
Transmission and distribution networks protection are usually handled dif-
ferently. Distribution network tends to focus mainly on overcurrent protection,
however, some technologies could potentially cross between transmission and dis-
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Figure 2.1: Substation data concentrator and sensor network.
tribution.
For distribution feeder protection without DERs, fuses and conventional re-
closers are the two commonly used protection devices. They do not have direc-
tional features, but modern digital relays do [25]. Furthermore, it is economically
impractical to replace all the fuses and conventional reclosers with advanced dig-
ital relays. However, it is still practical to use digital relays in medium voltage
(MV) distribution protection. In a system that uses fuses, if a fault happens,
replacing fuses would require extensive equipment outage times [26], which will
impact more customers. With digital relay, the breaker can be reset through the
EMS automatically.
Power distribution network protection schemes are continuously being chal-
lenged by the highly distributed and stochastic DERs. With the benefits of the
communication infrastructure provided by wide area protection, energy contribu-
tions from DERs could be measured more accurately through PMU compared
to SCADA system [27]. More data are available when a fault happens to assist
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in making relay tripping decisions. In the light of that, many researchers have
proposed more advanced protection schemes.
2.2 Implementation of Machine Learning in Dis-
tribution Network Protection
Since more data are available through PMU or any advanced meter infrastruc-
ture, advanced algorithms such as machine learning or deep learning can be im-
plemented in power system protection for fault identification[28, 29]. In [30],
a spatiotemporal patterns based machine learning method is proposed. This
method uses the graph Laplacian to recognize the spatiotemporal patterns based
on system wide measurements against cyber attacks. In [31], a Support Vector
Machine embedded Layered Decision Tree based anomaly detection and adaptive
load rejection within the set-up of multi-agent system integrity protection was
investigated. Furthermore, this method does not rely on wide area communica-
tion, but data sets are still available for decentralized agents. A least square
support vector machine Bayesian network decision tree is proposed in [32]. This
method can be used to fill the missing meter data as well as improve the detection
accuracy of relay protection.
Most of the machine learning based methods for power system protection are
focusing on combining different machine learning algorithms and adjusting hyper-
parameters such as detecting a fault signature [33], improving the fault detection
accuracy [34, 35], taking advantage of the advanced meter infrastructure and
predicting the potential of faults [36] for the primary side protection.
Very limited research has focused on exploring insights from meter data and
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finding the physical meaning from the kernel data. The difficulty also lies in the
coordination of the primary and the back-up protection when it comes to power
system planning and operation.
2.3 Distribution Network Protection Schemes
There are many different protection devices that are installed to protect particular
equipment and components. Various protection schemes are embedded in these
protection devices, each of them is suitable for a particular application and every
type has some advantages over the other. The primary protection schemes along
with the apparatus they are protecting are summarized in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Summary of the Primary Protection Schemes
Apparatus Overcurrent Directional Differential Distance
Alternator 0 1 1 1
Busbar 0 0 1 0
Transformer 0 0 1 0
Power Line 1 1 0 1
Large Induction Motor 1 0 1 0
In Table 2.1, “1” represents the corresponding protection scheme is suitable
for the apparatus. Alternatively, “0” means that the protection scheme might
not be a good fit for the apparatus. Sometimes, two protection schemes can be
embedded into the same protection devices. For example, the “SEL 421 Protec-
tion, Automation, and Control System” has both the distance and overcurrent
protection schemes. In the rest of the thesis, it is assumed that one primary
protection device has only one protection scheme.
At the other end of the spectrum, backup protection scheme is invented to
provide an extra layer of protection to the primary protection, particularly for
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the overcurrent and the distance protection. Typically, the backup of these two
protection schemes are realized through the inverse time overcurrent protection
[37] and time stepped distance protection [38], respectively.
A good relay backup protection scheme should consider the impact caused by
the injection of DERs, including the bidirectional flow and the lower sensitivity
of the protection system.
Using adaptive protection schemes is one of the solutions proposed in litera-
ture to alleviate the impact of injection of DERs [39, 40]. In such methods, relay
settings must be updated with the change of the distribution feeder status and
usually includes the shifting of inverse definite minimum time (IDMT) curve to
deal with the change of fault current [41]. In this way, the coordination between
relays can be maintained. However, when the system becomes more complicated,
there is little room for the relays to shift the IDMT curve as the shifting of the
IDMT of one relay would disrupt the coordination with the other adjacent relays.
In [39], the relay setting is set to be adaptive based on all down-stream relays’
pick up time and identify the status of the relay that picked up. A wide area
backup protection scheme is proposed in [42]. This method defines the backup
protection zones of the subsets of lines and buses which has a significant zero-
and/or positive-sequence. Linear least squares method is then used to deter-
mine the faulted line and location using the current and the voltage phasors. An
innovative hardware-in-the-loop adaptive protection scheme is presented in [43].
This method provides a continuously tuned protection scheme to the variable sys-
tem operating modes. In [44], an adaptive multi-stage definite time over current
protection scheme for ungrounded distribution systems with DERs is presented
based on optimized thevenin equivalent parameters estimation. A centralized
adaptive protection scheme is proposed in [45] to deal with the communication
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system failures between relays. It provides optimal relays settings for varying
operating conditions of the distribution networks with DERs.
Sometimes, the fault current cannot be seen by the measurement current
transformers (CTs), particularly when the DERs are injecting into the grid. Fur-
thermore, the backup protection relays cannot see as much fault current and may
not trip for a failure in the primary protection. In addition, when the system
becomes more complicated, there is little room for the relays to change their
settings adaptively as it would disrupt the coordination with the other adjacent




Impact of Distributed Energy
Resources to Distribution Grid
Protection
3.1 Introduction
The increasing penetration rate of DER has led to some serious protection coordi-
nation problems which do not ordinarily occur in conventional distribution grids
without DERs. One of the key problems is that the rising amount of distributed
and intermittent DERs can lead to bidirectional power flow in the distribution
grid and contribute to fault currents which may also flow in either direction based
on its location. The traditional distribution grid was designed for single direc-
tion power flow from the substation to the customers. Almost all of the feeder
protection schemes are designed based on this traditional concept. The intermit-
tent DERs at the customer end can now generate power that is consumed by the
customer or feed back excess power to the rest of the distribution feeder. In a
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very high penetration scenario, the back feed may affect transmission level power
flows as well. This raises new challenges to grid modeling methods in practical
problems of system protection where the impacts of DERs have to be considered.
3.2 Fundamentals of Distribution Network Pro-
tection
3.2.1 Principles of System Protection in Power Networks
Fundamentally, the objective of power system protection is to provide quick re-
sponse to a fault in a power system, so that the outage area can be minimized
and the rest of the power system will remain working in normal condition. To
achieve this objective, power system protection has long since followed the fol-
lowing basic design principles: Reliability, Selectivity, Sensitivity and Speed of
operation [46, 47]. These are discussed in turn as follows:
Reliability
Reliability is the property that is used to evaluate if the relay scheme is performing
consistently well in different scenarios. There are typically two ways to improve
the system reliability. One may be through duplicating the relay and sometimes
its associated switchgear. This is usually too expensive to be achieved particularly
for distribution protection. The other most common method is through backup
protection equipment utilizing another feeder zone’s equipment to increase the
reliability if the current zone protection fails. The reliability can be quantified
17





where NCT stands for the number of correct trips, NDT is the number of desired
trips and NIT is the number of incorrect trips.
Reliability can also be evaluated through dependability and security. Depend-












where TNT stands for the total number of trips.
Dependability can be improved by increasing the sensitivity of the protection
system. However, this comes at the cost of increasing the likelihood of nuisance
trips. Security of the protection system can be improved by increasing selectivity.
These are explained further in the next subsections.
Sensitivity
In a low to medium voltage power distribution network, fault levels are sometimes
lower compared to the transmission system, particularly for those feeders that lose
connection to the distribution grid [48]. Therefore, the protection system must
be sensitive enough to see the faults. Using the fault signature is a way to see
these lower level faults in some cases [49], but it is also depends on the fault type.
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For example, negative phase sequence filtering has been used in the past to detect
low level unsymmetrical faults that normal positive sequence protection would not
be sensitive enough to detect. If the low level unsymmetrical faults are sensitive
enough to be detected, the dependability can be improved. However, there are
issues with protection relay sensitivity when renewable DERs are injecting power
into the system during faults. This has not been adequately addressed in existing
research, but will be studied in this thesis.
Selectivity
Selectivity is defined as the ability to differentiate the normal condition and the
fault condition. For example, the inrush current of transformers and large motors
in a power system may surge up to 20 times of their rated currents, resembling
a short circuit. In this case, the relay has to be able to discriminate the inrush
from a genuine fault. One method in this example is identifying the large second
order harmonic of the inrush current and restraining the operation of the relay.
Therefore the inrush current and the fault current can be distinguished and the
selectivity of the relaying system is increased.
In addition, the relay must also be set to decide whether the fault happens
within its jurisdiction, previously referred to as the zone of protection. Thus the
relay should ideally only should only operate for faults in its zone or sometimes
back up the next zone, causing minimum impact to the system.
Speed of operation
Ideally, the relay should isolate the fault as quickly as possible to minimize dis-
turbance to the system. For example, instantaneous overcurrent relays operate
in one to one and a half cycles and the breaker mechanism takes an additional
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operating time of one and a half to three cycles (on a 60 Hz basis) [50]. Based
on [51], a high speed relay operates in less than 3 cycles. On the other hand, it
is sometimes advantageous to not operate too quickly in order for the protection
system to ride through transients or temporary overloads that can be tolerated
for a short duration.
It is difficult to achieve all of the aforementioned requirements at the maxi-
mum level. For example, if the protection relay sensitivity increases, its selectivity
may reduce as more relays will pickup the same fault. Thus, in practical real world
protection system design, compromises have to be made and some requirements
are prioritized at the expense of others.
3.2.2 Overcurrent Protection
To maintain the safety of the power system, current flow should be restricted
based on the current handling ability of the power line, conductors, switches,
load and transformers, etc. When the power system is operating at the normal
condition, current in each circuit should be restricted to equal or less than the
rated current. When a fault happens in the system, higher current level is ex-
pected known as the overcurrents. Overcurrents are expected to happen when
there are short circuits, overloading or inrush current in the system. This thesis
is mainly focusing on short circuits as it is more common and may lead to severe
consequences.
There are mainly two protective devices employed in distribution feeders to
isolate the power system fault current, either using fuses or overcurrent relays.
According to IEEE Standard C37.2-2008 [52], an overcurrent relay can be divided
into two subclasses: instantaneous overcurrent and inverse time overcurrent relay
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with device code 50 and 51 respectively. A type 50/51 relay initiates its operation
when the predetermined current setting is reached. This threshold is defined as
the pickup. If the fault does not clear itself after the relay picks up, the relay will
then trip the circuit breaker based on its time current curve (TCC).
Some of the overcurrent relays may include a reclosing function known as the
recloser with device code 79. A 79 type recloser could close the opened circuit
when the fault current is cleared. Overcurrent relays can also be fitted with a
directional feature which improves the selectivity by being able to ascertain the
vector direction of the fault current. This has been used in the past to selectively
trip parallel feeders when a reverse current flow is detected.
Fuses on the other hand have no directional feature or tripping logic. They
are selected to not operate under the rated current and are supposed to carry
the normal maximum load current without melting. However, it needs to be
replaced once the fault current has started melting the fuse element. However,
like an overcurrent relay, fuses do have fuse melting characteristics that is time-
current dependent based on the rate of melting and arc extinguishing time for a
given fault current.
Both of these protective devices have the time current characteristic which
is used to coordinate the multiple relays operating sequence when faults happen.
In a distribution grid, these two devices are often used together. Since fuses
cannot measure the fault current level directly, this research mainly focuses on
expanding upon overcurrent relay protection which uses current transformers
(CTs) to monitor the feeder currents in a distribution grid.
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3.2.3 Feeder Protection Coordination
To achieve the maximum protection, all protection relays need to be coordinated.
In a distribution grid, it is common for each single relay to be set up to not only
protect its own zone (known as the primary protection zone), but also protect
downstream zones (known as the backup protection zone). Thus the backup
protection zone of one relay can be overlapped with the primary protection zone
of downstream relay(s). In this case, if one downstream relay fails to pickup its
primary protection zone faults or there is a failed circuit breaker, the upstream
relay can pickup and trip its associated breaker for the backup protection zone
and isolate all of the downstream zone.
The diagram of a typical overcurrent protection coordination on a single line
distribution feeder is shown in Fig. 3.1.
Figure 3.1: An example of a common protection system scheme for primary and
backup protection of a radial distribution feeder
For this feeder, it can be observed that Relay R1 can see the fault F1 on its
primary protection zone Z1 or the fault on its downstream backup protection
zone Z2. Relay R2 can only see the fault F2 on its downstream backup protection
zone Z2. Thus the backup protection zone of R1 is overlapped with the primary
protection zone of R2.
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If F2 fault happens, both R1 and R2 will pickup at the same time. However
R1 will be set up to delay its operation relative to R2. In normal conditions, if R2
trips and the fault is cleared, R1 will dropout and not trip. If R2 fails to pickup
F2, R1 will trip after a delay. This whole process can be realized using the time
current curve.
Time Current Curve
Time current curve plots the interrupting time of a relay. It is used to show how
fast a relay will trip a breaker at any magnitude of fault current. With different
TCC, different relays can pick up at different times for the same fault. The three
types of TCCs are Instantaneous (INST), Definite Time (DT) and Inverse Time
Overcurrent (ITO). Their relationships can be explained by Fig. 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Relationship of different TCCs
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where t is the operating time of the relay, TMS stands for the time multiplier
setting of the relay, I
Is
is the ratio of magnitude of fault current and the relay
pickup current known as the Plug Setting Multiplier (PSM), A and B are the
two constants that relate to the type of relay and its specific characteristic.
DT is a straight line that is in parallel with the x axis, meaning that if the
fault current reaches a certain threshold, the relay will trip the breaker in a fixed
time duration. It is usually implemented for the backup protection.
INST is similar to DT, but the relay operating time is moved to 0 seconds
(no intentional time delay). It has the least sensitivity of all relays and does not
need any coordination. Usually, INST is used if the fault level is very high and a
trip is needed immediately without waiting.
Figure 3.3: Coordination of R1 and R2 using IDMT curve
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DT and ITO are often used together known as the IDMT curve. By setting
the IDMT curve, R1 and R2 could be coordinated as shown in Fig. 3.3. It can
be observed that if F2 happens, the trip time of R2 is faster than that of R1.
3.2.4 Symmetrical Components in Power System Protec-
tion
Normally, medium voltage power lines in distribution grids consists of three
phases, and sometimes in rural areas, it is more economical to run single phase lat-
eral lines. Ideally, the three phases of the power distribution line have a balanced
load. However, the three phases can become unbalanced caused by unbalanced
load or unsymmetrical fault current in the distribution grid, causing unbalanced
current or voltage. In this case, the symmetrical coordinate is proposed in [53].
Essentially, it describes how to transfer the three phases unbalanced current or
voltage into three sets of balanced components known as positive, negative and
zero sequence current or voltage components. These balanced components are de-
fined as the symmetrical components. The balanced and unbalanced three-phase
phasors are shown in Fig. 3.4.
It is convenient to use the unit phasor a with an angle displacement of 2
3
π
rads to describe the balanced sequence component angle such that,
a = 1 120◦
a2 = 1 240◦
a3 = 1 360◦.
(3.5)
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(a) Balanced System (b) Unbalanced System
Figure 3.4: Balanced and unbalanced three-phase phasor
The unbalanced three phase current can be expressed as
Ia = I1 + I2 + I0
Ib = a
2I1 + aI2 + I0
Ic = aI1 + a
2I2 + I0,
(3.6)
where Ia, Ib and Ic are the phasor representation for the three phase currents. I0,
I1 and I2 represent the zero sequence, positive sequence and negative sequence
currents as shown in Fig. 3.5.
Physically speaking, in a three phase system, a positive sequence set of cur-
rents produces a normal rotating field, a negative sequence set of currents pro-
duces a rotation field that is opposite to the positive sequence set of currents, and
the zero sequence current set produces a field that oscillates but does not rotate
in space.
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(a) Positive Sequence (b) Negative Sequence (c) Zero Sequence
Figure 3.5: Sequence Components
















Based on Eq.(3.7), the three phase unbalanced currents become a linear combi-
nation of a balanced set of sequence components. The unbalanced three phase
voltage can be expressed with a similar equation. In practice, the overcurrent
relays operate based on the root mean square (RMS) value or the phasor mag-
nitude value of the positive sequence components. Negative phase sequence is
used in special applications such as detecting high impedance unbalanced faults




In this thesis, the fault of interest is of the short circuit kind and not the open
circuit type. Not all of the fault types can cause unbalanced currents or voltages.
Essentially, there are two categories of fault types, either symmetrical fault or
unsymmetrical fault.
Symmetrical faults
When symmetrical faults happen in a three phase system, all the phases are short
circuited. They could either short circuit to each other, or to earth. When the
three phase conductors connect to each other, it is defined as a line-to-line-to-line
(LLL) fault. Similarly, when the three phases short circuit together and connect
to earth, it is defined as a line-to-line-to-line-to ground LLLG fault. The LLL
and LLLG faults are symmetrical since the fault is balanced. They are the most
severe kinds of faults in power system, but are less common because multiple-
point failures are required to cause this.
Unsymmetrical faults
Unsymmetrical faults are more common than symmetrical faults. A line-to-
ground (LG) fault happens when one of the three phase lines is grounded or
comes in contact with the neutral conductor. A line-to-line (LL) fault happens
when two of the three phase lines are short circuited. A line-to-line-to-ground
(LLG) fault happens when two of the three phase lines come in contact with the
neutral conductor or ground. More than 95% of faults in the power system are
these three types of faults, but they are not as severe as the symmetrical faults.
Moreover, sometimes their fault levels are very small and hard to detect due to
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high impedances bridging the connections such as debris or tree limbs. On the
other hand, unsymmetrical faults may lead to more severe symmetrical faults if
they are not isolated in time.
3.3 Main Protection Issues Considering the In-
tegration of DERs on Distribution Feeders
3.3.1 Blinding of Protection
One of the emerging problems with the rise in DER in distribution grids is the
issue of protection system blinding. The following scenario demonstrates this
phenomena. In Fig. 3.6, an inverter based solar photovoltaic (SPV) system is
connected to a distribution feeder. Relay 1 and Relay 2 are two IDMT overcurrent
relays. The currents seen by Relays 1 and 2 are I⃗1 and I⃗2, respectively.
Figure 3.6: Blinding of Protection
Due to Kirchhoff’s current law, I⃗1 = I⃗4 + I⃗3 − I⃗2. In the case of a fault
happening at the end of the feeder, as shown in Fig. 3.6, I⃗3 is decreased, I⃗4 rises
up to twice its rated current [54]. The fault current seen by Relay 1, defined
as the backup relay, is less than that of Relay 2 defined as the primary relay.
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Depending on the fault level and the rating of the SPV system, if Relay 2 fails
to isolate the fault, Relay 1 may not pickup in time or trip for the fault after a
while due to the partial blinding effect of seeing a reduced fault current.
3.3.2 Sympathetic tripping
Another problem is the issue of sympathetic tripping with DERs. This is demon-
strated in the following scenario. In Fig. 3.7, two feeders are connected in parallel
with each feeder equipped with a non-directional IDMT relay. The current seen
by Relay 1 is I⃗1 and I⃗2 is seen by Relay 2.
Figure 3.7: Sympathetic Trapping
In the case when a fault happens downstream of Relay 1, as shown in Fig.
3.7, I⃗2 flows towards Relay 2, I⃗3 ≈ 0A, and I⃗4 is increased. The fault current
seen by Relay 2 is higher than the situation without DERs (assuming the DERs
are generating some level of power). This would lead to the tripping of Relay 2
ahead of Relay 1.
Although this thesis is mainly focusing on the blinding of protection relay
issue, the proposed method could potentially be used for alleviating sympathetic
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tripping as well.
3.4 EMTP Simulation of Blinding Issue in Feeder
Protection
In this section, the blinding of protection issue is reproduced with simulations
to show the impact of DERs to the distribution feeder protection. These set of
simulations are intended to not only highlight the problems, but also establish a
known baseline to compare the benefits of alternative protection system solutions.
3.4.1 Distribution Feeder Protection Circuit
The simulation of a distribution feeder with DER is conducted in EMTP simula-
tion software. EMTP is used to model the time-domain electromagnetic transient
behavior of the power system in the normal and faulted conditions. The circuit
diagram that is being simulated is shown in Fig. 3.8.
Figure 3.8: Distribution Feeder Protection Circuit
In Fig. 3.8, Si_j stands for the jth current source that connects to bus i. In
this thesis, the current source is defined as any DERs, loads or substations that
are connected to the buses. Each current source is connected to the bus with its
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corresponding circuit breaker labeled as “X”. U⃗1 and U⃗2 represents the voltage
on bus 1 and bus 2 respectively. The line impedance between bus 1 and bus 2 is
specified as a short line model with R+ jX. The distribution grid that connects
to bus 1 is considered as an infinite bus.
The simulation parameters are shown as follows. The total simulation time
is 3 seconds with a time step of 10−5 second. A fault happens at 1.5 seconds as
shown in Fig. 3.8. The faults are initiated with the build in fault component in
EMTP. They are all set to the directly short fault without resistances between
lines or line to the ground. The same fault setting is used throughout this thesis.
The rated voltage of the distribution grid is set to be 34.5 kV. Current source
S1_2 has an AC load of 24 MW and 9 MVAR; S2_1 has an AC load of 6 MW and
1.5 MVAR; S2_2 has an AC load of 9 MW and 3 MVAR. The line impedance is
set to 2.478 + 6.742jΩ.
The EMTP simulation diagram of the distribution feeder protection circuit is






























In this simulation, both R1 and R2 relays are enabled. The relay models are
all set to be the SEL 721 overcurrent relay. Based on the protection principle
that was introduced in this chapter, R2 should trip for its downstream faults
ahead of R1. All types of fault are tested, including LG, LL, LLG, LLL and
LLLG. Only the positive sequence of current and voltage are measured in this
simulation. All the relays are set to be tripped based on the phasor magnitude
value of the positive sequence current. The phasor angle value of the positive
sequence current and voltage are also included. This is used as a comparison to
the results in the following chapters. The simulation result of the distribution
feeder protection circuit is shown in the following figures.
Primary Protection
The voltage magnitude and angle of both buses are shown in Fig. 3.10 and 3.11.
The current magnitude and angle of each of the sources are shown in Fig. 3.12,
3.13, 3.14 and 3.15. The line current IL is shown in Fig. 3.16. The tripping
signal captured by the both relays is shown in Fig. 3.17.
In the distribution feeder primary protection, when the fault happens at 1.5
seconds, both R1 and R2 picked up. However, the TCC of R2 has less tripping
time compared to R1 at this fault level, thus it trips before R1. R1 will not
operate for this fault in this case. The magnitude of S2_1, S2_2, V2 and IL are
all zero because of the tripping of R2. The tripping time of all types of faults is
between 0.27 and 0.31 second.
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(a) Voltage V1 magnitude
(b) Voltage V1 angle
Figure 3.10: Primary Protection Voltage on Bus 1 of Distribution Feeder Protec-
tion Circuit
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(a) Voltage V2 magnitude
(b) Voltage V2 angle
Figure 3.11: Primary Protection Voltage on Bus 2 of Distribution Feeder Protec-
tion Circuit
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(a) Current source S1_1 magnitude
(b) Current source S1_1 angle
Figure 3.12: Primary protection current sources 1 connected to bus 1
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(a) Current source S1_2 magnitude
(b) Current source S1_2 angle
Figure 3.13: Primary protection current sources 2 connected to bus 1
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(a) Current source S2_1 magnitude
(b) Current source S2_1 angle
Figure 3.14: Primary protection current source 1 connected to bus 2
39
(a) Current source S2_2 magnitude
(b) Current source S2_2 angle
Figure 3.15: Primary protection current source 2 connected to bus 2
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(a) Line current IL magnitude
(b) Line current IL angle
Figure 3.16: Primary Protection Line Current of Distribution Feeder Protection
Circuit
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(a) Relay R1 tripping signal
(b) Relay R2 tripping signal




In this simulation, the primary protection relay is assumed to have failed. This
is done in the simulation by disabling R2 and observing how the upstream relay
functions. The backup is set to have a higher time delay and sensitivity so that
it can see faults in its own zone and next zone. Ideally, R1 should pickup when
fault occurs at 1.5 seconds.
The voltage magnitude and angle of both buses are shown in Fig. 3.18 and
3.19. The current magnitude and angle of each source are shown in Fig. 3.20-3.23.
The line current IL is shown in Fig. 3.24. The tripping signal captured by the
both relays is shown in Fig. 3.25.
It can be observed from the above figures that, when the fault happens at 1.5
seconds and the primary protection is disabled in the distribution feeder protec-
tion circuit, R2 will not pick up. R1 will trip for its downstream faults. Thus
it can be observed that R1 trips all types of faults at approximately 0.35 second
which is later compared to the tripping time of R2 in the primary protection.
Since R1 trips, the magnitudes of S12 and V1 also becomes zero indicating the
faulted section has been isolated from the source.
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(a) Voltage V1 magnitude
(b) Voltage V1 angle
Figure 3.18: Backup protection voltage on bus 1 of distribution feeder protection
circuit
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(a) Voltage V2 magnitude
(b) Voltage V2 angle
Figure 3.19: Backup protection voltage on bus 2 of distribution feeder protection
circuit
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(a) Current source S1_1 magnitude
(b) Current source S1_1 angle
Figure 3.20: Backup protection current sources 1 connected to bus 1
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(a) Current source S1_2 magnitude
(b) Current source S1_2 angle
Figure 3.21: Backup protection current sources 2 connected to bus 1
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(a) Current source S2_1 magnitude
(b) Current source S2_1 angle
Figure 3.22: Backup protection current sources 1 connected to bus 2
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(a) Current source S2_2 magnitude
(b) Current source S2_2 angle
Figure 3.23: Backup protection current sources 2 connected to bus 2
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(a) Line current IL magnitude
(b) Line current IL angle
Figure 3.24: Backup Protection Line Current of Distribution Feeder Protection
Circuit
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(a) R1 tripping signal
(b) R2 tripping signal
Figure 3.25: Backup Protection Tripping Signal of Distribution Feeder Protection
Circuit
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3.4.2 Distribution Feeder Protection with DERs
The diagram of the distribution feeder protection circuit with DERs is shown in
Fig. 3.26. In this diagram, a SPV is connected to bus 1 named as S1_3. The
EMTP simulation diagram of Fig. 3.26 is shown in Fig. 3.27.




































In this simulation, the SPV system consists of a set of 5 sub-panels. Each
of the sub-panels has a rated power of 1.67 MVA. The total rated power is 8.33
MVA. It takes 0.4 second for the DERs to be initialized. The simulation result
in this case is shown as follows.
Primary Protection
The voltage magnitude and angle of both buses are shown in Fig. 3.28 and 3.29.
The current magnitude and angle of each source are shown in Fig. 3.30, 3.31,
3.32, 3.33 and 3.34. The line current IL is shown in Fig. 3.35. The tripping
signal generated by both protection relays are shown in Fig. 3.36.
It is evident from the below figures that, with 5 solar panels injection of DERs
into bus 1, the primary protection R2 trips for all types of faults as well. The
tripping time for all types of faults is between 0.2 and 0.3 seconds. This time is
slightly faster than the tripping time in the distribution feeder protection circuit
without DERs. This is because of the increased contribution of DERs to the fault
current, thus accelerating the tripping time of R2. R1 does not trip in this case
as R2 is enabled and it will trip ahead of R1.
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(a) Voltage V1 magnitude
(b) Voltage V1 angle
Figure 3.28: Primary protection voltage on bus 1 of distribution feeder protection
circuit with DERs
55
(a) Voltage V2 magnitude
(b) Voltage V2 angle
Figure 3.29: Primary protection voltage on bus 2 of distribution feeder protection
circuit with DERs
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(a) Current source S1_1 magnitude
(b) Current source S1_1 angle
Figure 3.30: Primary protection current source 1 on bus 1 of distribution feeder
protection circuit with DERs
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(a) Current source S1_2 magnitude
(b) Current source S1_2 angle
Figure 3.31: Primary protection current source 2 on bus 1 of distribution feeder
protection circuit with DERs
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(a) Current source S1_3 magnitude
(b) Current source S1_3 angle
Figure 3.32: Primary protection current source 3 on bus 1 of distribution feeder
protection circuit with DERs
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(a) Current source S2_1 magnitude
(b) Current source S2_1 angle
Figure 3.33: Primary protection current source 1 on bus 2 of distribution feeder
protection circuit with DERs
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(a) Current source S2_2 magnitude
(b) Current source S2_2 angle
Figure 3.34: Primary protection current source 2 on bus 2 of distribution feeder
protection circuit with DERs
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(a) Line current IL magnitude
(b) Line current IL angle
Figure 3.35: Primary protection line current of distribution feeder protection
circuit with DERs
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(a) Relay R1 tripping signal
(b) Relay R2 tripping signal
Figure 3.36: Primary Protection Tripping Signal of Distribution Feeder Protec-
tion Circuit with DERs
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Backup Protection
Most settings in the backup protection are similar to the primary protection,
except that the R2 relay is disabled. Ideally, R1 should trip when a fault happens
at 1.5 seconds.
The voltage magnitude and angle of both buses are shown in Fig. 3.37 and
3.38. The current magnitude and angle of each source are shown in Fig. 3.39,
3.40 ,3.41, 3.42 and 3.43. The line current IL is shown in Fig. 3.44. The tripping
signal generated by both relays are shown in Fig. 3.45.
It can be observed from the below figures that, when the primary protection
is disabled again, R2 will not pick up. It is expected that R1 will pick up and
trip for the fault downstream. However, the tripping signal of R1 is zero. The
fault will never be cleared automatically in this case, because the injection of the
DER causes the blinding of the upstream backup protection.
Since the fault is not cleared between 1.5 to 3 seconds, the collected mea-
surements can be used to show the impact of the fault. Bus 1 is connected to
the infinite bus, thus V1 magnitude is reduced after the fault. LLLG is the most
severe type of fault thus it causes the most significant voltage drop. Not all of
the V2 magnitude are zero after fault. This is because of the use of positive se-
quence voltage measurement. For those unsymmetrical faults, there are at least
one phase that is not short circuited. In this case, the V2 magnitude will not be
zero based on the voltage form of Eq. (3.6). The current magnitude of infinite
bus S1_1 and DER S1_3 are also worthy of discussion. S1_3 only increases to 1.2
times its original magnitude whereas S1_1 increases to 3 times its original value.
Thus it is hard to distinguish the fault current by only measuring the contribution
of the DER as the fault signature is not significant. Moreover, if the penetration
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rate of the DER keeps increasing, the signature of the fault current coming from
the infinite bus will no longer be a significant value.
(a) Voltage V1 magnitude
(b) Voltage V1 angle
Figure 3.37: Backup protection voltage on bus 1 of distribution feeder protection
circuit with DER
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(a) Voltage V2 magnitude
(b) Voltage V2 angle
Figure 3.38: Backup protection voltage on bus 2 of distribution feeder protection
circuit with DER
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(a) Current source S1_1 magnitude
(b) Current source S1_1 angle
Figure 3.39: Backup protection current source 1 on bus 1 of distribution feeder
protection circuit with DERs
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(a) Current source S1_2 magnitude
(b) Current source S1_2 angle
Figure 3.40: Backup protection current source 2 on bus 1 of distribution feeder
protection circuit with DERs
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(a) Current source S1_3 magnitude
(b) Current source S1_3 angle
Figure 3.41: Backup protection current source 3 on bus 1 of distribution feeder
protection circuit with DERs
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(a) Current source S2_1 magnitude
(b) Current source S2_1 angle
Figure 3.42: Backup protection current source 1 on bus 2 of distribution feeder
protection circuit with DERs
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(a) Current source S2_2 magnitude
(b) Current source S2_2 angle
Figure 3.43: Backup protection current source 2 on bus 2 of distribution feeder
protection circuit with DERs
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(a) Line current IL magnitude
(b) Line current IL angle
Figure 3.44: Backup Protection Line Current of Distribution Feeder Protection
Circuit with DERs
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(a) Relay R1 tripping signal
(b) Relay R2 tripping signal
Figure 3.45: Backup Protection Tripping Signal of Distribution Feeder Protection
Circuit with DERs
3.5 Conclusion
For most cases, when the primary relay fails to trip, the back up relay has the
potential of failing to pickup or trip in advance to stay in coordination with
downstream protection. What is expected is both relays pickup at the same time
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and the trip operating time is based on their IDMT curves.
A possible improvement is sought that if the backup relay can get the fault
information of the primary relay and operate correctly, the aforementioned mal-
functioned relay problems will no longer exist. However, even if the backup relay
can get the fault information of the primary relay, it does not know how to use
this information to operate properly. Moreover, the backup relay will not pickup
until receiving the fault information of the primary relay. The grading margin
that caused by the delaying of breaker mechanism operating time should also be




Theory of Current Tracing
Analytics
4.1 Introduction
It was demonstrated in the previous chapter that increasing penetration of renew-
able energy has led to some serious protection coordination problems which do
not ordinarily occur in conventional distribution grids with low renewable energy
penetration. One of the key problems as mentioned before is the rising amount
of distributed and intermittent renewable energy that can disrupt the existing
protection coordination scheme. One approach to dealing with these issues is to
examine the network topology and the need to mathematically resolve them in
real time as a basis for new protection relaying algorithms.
The traditional distribution grids are designed for single direction power flow
from the substation to the customers. The renewable energy at the customer end
can now generate power that is consumed by the customer or feedback excess
power to the rest of the distribution feeder. In a very high penetration scenario,
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the back feed may affect transmission level power flows. This raises new challenges
to grid modeling methods in practical problems of state estimation and feeder
protection, where the impacts of excess power flow have to be considered.
Many grid modeling methods have been proposed previously. Some of the
modeling methods target different types of power grids. In [55, 56], the author
proposed averaged models for modular multilevel converter for high voltage direct
current systems. In [57], the author took advantage of the public map data for
the generation of model grids in all voltage levels of the distribution grid. A port-
Hamiltonian based dynamic power system model is established in [58], which
accounts for all the key elements of power system, including the grid modeling.
Most of the grid modeling methods are designed for particular parts of the
power grid, including the cyber-physical power systems framework modeling
[59, 60], topology modeling [61, 62], load flow modeling [63, 64], traveling wave
modeling [65]. Almost all of these methods are based on the existing physical
infrastructure of power system in which currents from different power sources are
congested to one end of the single power line and flowing towards the other.
To solve the aforementioned practical problems, a more detailed grid model
has been suggested, which not only gives the overall picture of the power grid,
but also has sufficient details of the current flows from each individual renewable
energy source connected to the grid.
Inspired by Dr. Yu’s paper’s of transmission line dissection [66], the author of
this thesis modifies and expands upon this technique of electrical decomposition of
networks for a generalized current tracing method for distribution grids. Instead
of using the traditional grid model of currents that are congested on a single power
line, the power line following the fundamental electrical and physical principles is
decomposed such that currents from each individual power source can be viewed
76
as virtually flowing through the decomposed power lines. When all the lines in
the power grid are decomposed in this manner, it becomes possible to trace the
currents flowing from different renewable energy sources to different loads. By
doing so, this technique can lend itself to better fault current flow identification
for improved protection system responses.
4.2 Formulation of Multiple Sources to Grid Cur-
rent Tracing
4.2.1 Single Distribution System Feeder Line Example
Consider the single power distribution line case where multiple renewable energy
and loads are connected to bus 1 with the other end connecting to the power
distribution grid as shown in Fig. 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Single power distribution line
The currents I⃗L flowing towards either bus 1 or bus 2 depend on the load
and power generation on bus 1. U⃗1 and U⃗2 are the voltages on bus 1 and bus
2 respectively. Generally, the currents in a distribution grid will flow from the
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substation transformer to customers, in this case, from bus 2 to bus 1. The
bidirectional power flow appears when the load on bus 1 cannot consume as
much power as generated at the same time. The excess power must flow from
bus 1 towards bus 2. The currents will also flow from bus 1 to bus 2. Moreover,
it is necessary to know how much each current source contributes to the I⃗L, for
the purpose of the protection relay coordination during a fault.
4.2.2 Multiple Equivalent Current Source Model
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that the impedance between bus 1 and
bus 2 is
Z = R + jX, (4.1)
where R > 0 and X > 0 are the resistance and reactance of the power line
respectively.
The impedance angle is θ and the voltage difference angle of U⃗1 and U⃗2 is ψ. The
current I⃗L that is flowing through the power line is
I⃗L = ILe
j(ψ−θ), (4.2)
where IL > 0 is the magnitude of I⃗L. The ith current source connects to bus 1
can be written as,
I⃗Li = ILie
jϕi , (4.3)
where ϕi is the phase angle of the ith current source, and ILi > 0 is the magnitude







The single power line can be expressed with an impedance as shown in Fig. 4.1.
Its equivalent circuit as shown in Fig. 4.2 has the same property as the original
one, i.e., the total amount of current and power that flows from bus 1 to bus 2 is
the same.
Figure 4.2: Active-reactive current equivalent circuit
The equivalent circuit consist of two parallel connected equivalent resistance










where RE and XE are the equivalent resistance and reactance respectively which











4.2.4 Active and Reactive Current
In Fig. 4.2, the equivalent circuit splits the current into two parts. The current
that flows through the resistance is defined as active current, and the reactive
current is defined as the current flowing through the reactance. This is in contrast
to Fig. 4.1 in which the active and reactive current are flowing through the same
line. In Fig. 4.2, the two types of currents are virtually flowing through two
parallel connected virtual power lines.
The active current I⃗LR in I⃗L is in phase with the applied voltage U⃗1 − U⃗2 on
the single power line as there is no phase shift on the equivalent resistance,
I⃗LR = ILRe
jψ, (4.8)
ILR = ILcos(θ), (4.9)
where ILR is the magnitude of the active current I⃗LR.






ILX = ILsin(θ), (4.11)
where ILX is the magnitude of the reactive current I⃗LX .
The sum of active and reactive current has to be equal to the total power line
current,
I⃗L = I⃗LR + I⃗LX . (4.12)
The relationship between I⃗L, I⃗X and I⃗R is shown in Fig.4.3.
80
Figure 4.3: Active and reactive current
4.2.5 Current Tracing
All the current sources connected on bus 1 should follow the same rule,





where I⃗Li is the current of the ith current source on the power line, and
ILRi = ILicos(ψ − ϕi), (4.14)
ILXi = ILisin(ψ − ϕi), (4.15)
are the magnitude of the active and reactive current of I⃗Li respectively. The sets
of the active and reactive current magnitudes, ILRi and ILXi, are defined as ΩRM
and ΩXM such that,
ΩRM = {ILRi|0 < i ≤ Number of Current Sources} (4.16)
ΩXM = {ILXi|0 < i ≤ Number of Current Sources} (4.17)
where M represents that both sets are the current magnitude sets.
From Kirchhoff’s current law, the sum of the active and reactive current from
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each current source should be equal to the total active and reactive current on
















(I⃗LXi) = I⃗LX , (4.19)
where each of the two sums also constitutes of two parts as shown on the left












(I⃗LXi) represents the positive and negative part of reactive
current on the power line respectively. The two parts are classified by whether







(I⃗LXi) will be responsible for supplying the load
as well as feeding excess current from one current source to the others.
The relationship of the currents is shown in Fig. 4.4.
In Fig. 4.4, RE and jXE are the two axes that stands for the equivalent
resistance and reactance as shown in Eq. (4.5) and (4.6). The power line current
I⃗L can be projected to the RE and jXE axes, known as I⃗LR and I⃗LX . The power
line current I⃗L is consisted of four current sources: I⃗1, I⃗2, I⃗3 and I⃗4. Each of
them can be projected to the RE and jXE axes, known as I⃗LRi and I⃗LXi. If I⃗LRi
and I⃗LXi are pointed to the same direction of I⃗LR and I⃗LX , they are considered
as positive current sources that are providing active or reactive current to I⃗L. As
mentioned in Eq. (4.18) and (4.19), they will be responsible for supplying the load
as well as feeding excess current from one current source to the others. However,
this excess current value should be quantified such that the detailed contribution
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Figure 4.4: Relationship of currents
from each current source to the power distribution line will be available for further
analysis.
4.2.6 Current Tracing on Distribution Power Line
Only the positive current source can contribute excess current to the other ones.
If the two current sources are connected through a power line, it is necessary to
quantify the excess current that flows through the power line. The jth positive
current source that flows through the line is
I⃗LRjP = ILRjP e
jψ, (4.20)







where I⃗LRjP is positive part of the jth active current source flowing through the
power line with magnitude of ILRjP , I⃗LXjP is positive part of the jth reactive
current source flowing through the power line with magnitude of ILXjP .
The magnitude of the positive part of the jth active and reactive current depends












Therefore, the distribution power grid model where each of the currents are inde-
pendent from each other can be shown in Fig. 4.5.
Figure 4.5: Multiple current sources tracing equivalent circuit














where REj and XEj stand for the positive resistance and reactance of jth par-
allel connected virtual branch as shown in Fig. 4.5. It is an equivalent circuit

























Therefore, the virtual parallel connected power lines have the same impedance as
that of Eq. (4.1). This proves the correctness of the proposed theory that it will
not violate any physical and electrical principles.
4.2.7 Equivalent Circuit of Impedance Lines
With the information expressed in Eq. (4.24-4.27), an equivalent can be estab-
lished with the virtual parallel connected lines. Each of these power lines has
a virtual impedance of REj or XEj. By combining REj and XEj, the virtual












Then the virtual current that is flowing through 1
ZEj
is,
I⃗LZjP = I⃗LRjP + I⃗LXjP . (4.29)
where I⃗LZjP is defined as the decomposed current that flows from the jth current
source to the power distribution line. The equivalent circuit could be represented
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as shown in Fig.4.6,
Figure 4.6: Equivalent circuit of impedance lines
With the information of the equivalent circuit of impedance lines, the values
of decomposed currents can be quantified. The detailed current contribution from
each current source to the power line is now available.
4.2.8 Alternative Situations
It is assumed in Eq. (4.1) that R > 0 and X > 0, but the developed current
tracing model also works for the R > 0 and X < 0 situation. In this case, all of
the ψ − π
2
terms in the equations become ψ + π
2
. To facilitate analysis, only the
R > 0 and X > 0 situation is considered in the rest of the thesis.
It is also assumed that the current is flowing from bus 1 to bus 2, in which
the current magnitudes in Eq. (4.22) and (4.23) are positive. Alternatively,
the current magnitudes in Eq. (4.22) and (4.23) are negative if the curernt is
flowing from bus 2 to bus 1. Notice that the current tracing equation derived in
Subsection 4.2.6 is also suitable for the situation where bus 1 is connecting to the
distribution grid while bus 2 is connecting to multiple current sources no matter
which direction the current is flowing on the power line.
86
4.3 Formulation of Multiple Sources to Multiple
Sources on Single Distribution Line
In Fig. 4.1, only the current from multiple current sources to a single current
source on the power distribution line is decomposed. In reality, DERs could
connect on both sides of the power line, as shown in Fig. 4.7. Moreover, bus 2 is
connecting to the distribution grid. Therefore, it is necessary to decompose the
current from multiple current sources to multiple current sources such that the
decomposed current between each current sources can be derived.
Figure 4.7: Multiple sources to multiple sources on single distribution line
4.3.1 Current Tracing of Multiple Sources to Multiple
Sources
Here, it is assumed that there are m current sources connected to bus 1 and n
current sources connected to bus 2. All m current sources attached to bus 1 are
already decomposed as shown in Eq. (4.22), (4.23) and (4.29). Defining the set
of decomposed currents on the power line from bus 1 that connect m current
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sources as
ΩRin = {I⃗1LRi|0 ≤ i ≤ m}, (4.30)
ΩXin = {I⃗1LXi|0 ≤ i ≤ m}, (4.31)
where I⃗1LRi and I⃗1LXi stands for the ith active and reactive current on the power
line from bus 1 that connects m current source respectively, ΩRin and ΩXin are
the two sets of the above active and reactive current.
Similarly, the set of decomposed currents on the power line from bus 2 that
connect n current source is defined as
ΩRout = {I⃗2LRj|0 ≤ j ≤ n}, (4.32)
ΩXout = {I⃗2LXj|0 ≤ j ≤ n} (4.33)
where I⃗2LRj and I⃗2LXj stands for the jth active and reactive current on the power
line from bus 2 that connect n current sources respectively, ΩRout and ΩXout are
the two sets of the above active and reactive current.
Given the situation that the voltage difference between the two buses should
be the same, no matter how the form of the equivalent circuit changes, a mapping
from the set of decomposed current ΩRin and ΩXin to ΩRout and ΩXout are
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established such that,










where I⃗i′jLR stands for the active current flowing from current source I1LRi ∈ ΩRin
to I2LRj ∈ ΩRout. Similarly, I⃗i′jLX stands for the reactive current flowing from
current source I1LXi ∈ ΩXin to I2LXj ∈ ΩXout.
Therefore, the decomposed current that flows from the ith current source
connected to bus 1 to the jth current source connected to bus 2 can be written
as
I⃗i′jL = I⃗i′jLR + I⃗i′jLX . (4.38)
The combination of active and reactive current is defined as Ω such that,
Ωin_out = ΩRin_out + ΩXin_out, (4.39)
where Ωin_out = {I⃗i′jL | 0 ≤ i ≤ m, 0 ≤ j ≤ n},
ΩRin_out = {I⃗i′jLR | 0 ≤ i ≤ m, 0 ≤ j ≤ n},
ΩXin_out = {I⃗i′jLX | 0 ≤ i ≤ m, 0 ≤ j ≤ n}.
The mapping of a single decomposed current from the ith current source con-
nected to bus 1 to the jth current source that connects to bus 2 can be defined
as,
Ωin_out_i_j = I⃗i′jL, (4.40)
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where Ωin_out_i_j ∈ Ωin_out. Therefore, the magnitude and angle of Ωin_out_i_j
can be represented as Ωin_out_mag_i_j and Ωin_out_rad_i_j respectively.
Figure 4.8: Equivalent circuit of multiple sources to multiple sources on single
distribution line










considering the voltage on bus 1 and bus 2 of the equivalent circuit is the same
as the original one shown in Fig. 4.1.
Its equivalent circuit of impedance lines could be represented as shown in Fig.
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4.9,
Figure 4.9: Equivalent circuit of multiple sources to multiple sources impedance










The impedance line ZEi′j represents the connection between two current sources
that connect to different buses. If both of the two current sources are loads, or
provide positive active and reactive current to the power line, this value does not
exist. This is shown with simulations in the following section.
4.4 A Simulation of Current Tracing for a Small
Distribution Line with Multiple Sources
4.4.1 Simulated Test System
In the following a simulation of the current tracing decomposition is carried out
on a single distribution line system as shown in Fig. 4.7. The parameters of
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the system are Z = 0.005 + 0.0350j. U⃗1 = 1, U⃗2 = 0.9662 − 0.0298j, I⃗L =
0.9710−0.8276i, m = 4 and n = 3. The per-unit system is used through out this
section. The current sources on both side of line are listed in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: The Current Sources











From Eq. (4.5) and (4.6), the equivalent resistance and reactance in Fig. 4.2
is RE = 0.2500 pu, XE = 0.0357 pu.
4.4.2 Results of Multiple Sources to Grid Current Tracing
The decomposed current in Eq. (4.13) that is flowing between bus 1 and bus
2 in the equivalent circuit is listed in Table 4.2. In Table 4.2, the positive el-
ements indicate an absorption of power whereas negative elements represents
generating power. Only currents with positive magnitude can contribute to the
current flowing through the distribution line. The results of current tracing on
the distribution line described by Eq. (4.20-4.21) are shown in Table 4.3.
In Table 4.3, a value of 0 means the corresponding current source does not
contribute to the current on the distribution line. The phase angle of currents
with positive magnitude in Table 4.3 are the same to that of Table 4.2. This
proves that in Eq. (4.20-4.21), the angle of the currents are the same to that of
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Table 4.2: Results of Current Tracing of Eq. (4.13)
Bus Current Source Active Current Reactive Current
Mag/pu Phase/° Mag/pu Phase/°
1
1’ 0.7306 41.4284 1.3531 -48.5716
2’ -0.8959 41.4284 -1.6002 -48.5716
3’ -0.0846 41.4284 2.2572 -48.5716
4’ 0.4303 41.4284 -0.7471 -48.5716
2
1 0.9875 41.4284 -0.4955 -48.5716
2 -0.0506 41.4284 1.13909 -48.5716
3 -0.7565 41.4284 0.03676 -48.5716
Table 4.3: Results of Current Tracing of Eq. (4.20-4.21)
Bus Current Source Active Current Reactive Current
Mag/pu Phase/° Mag/pu Phase/°
1
1’ 0.1135 41.4284 0.4734 -48.5716
2’ 0 0 0 0
3’ 0 0 0.7897 -48.5716
4’ 0.0669 41.4284 0 0
2
1 0.1804 41.4284 0 0
2 0 0 0.9990 -48.5716
3 0 0 0.2640 -48.5716
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Eq. (4.13).
The results of the equivalent circuit parameter described by Eq. (4.26-4.28)
is shown in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Equivalent Circuit Parameter of Eq. (4.26-4.28)
Bus Current Source Sub-resistance Sub-reactance Impedance
pu pu pu
1
1’ 0.3972 0.0953 0.0216+0.0901i
2’ ∞ ∞ ∞
3’ ∞ 0.0571 0.0571i
4’ 0.6744 ∞ 0.6744
2
1 0.2500 ∞ 0.2500
2 ∞ 0.0452 0.0452i
3 ∞ 0.1708 0.1708i
These infinity parameters mean there is no sub resistance or reactance from
the corresponding current sources to the other end of the line.
4.4.3 Results of Multiple Source to Multiple Source Cur-
rent Tracing
The results of multiple sources to multiple sources current tracing on the power
line calculated by Eq. (4.34-4.35), (4.36-4.37) and (4.38) are shown in Table 4.5,
4.6 and 4.7, respectively.
In Table 4.5-4.7, zero magnitude and angle stand for no current can be decom-
posed between the two corresponding current sources. It is noteworthy that some
of the current sources only receive or contribute active current. For example, the
decomposed current between current source 4’, and current source 1. Some of
the current sources only receive or contribute reactive current, for example, the
decomposed current between current source 1’ and current source 2. The sum of
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Table 4.5: Multiple Sources to Multiple Sources Active Current Tracing on the
Power Line
Current Source 1 2 3
Mag/pu Phase/° Mag/pu Phase/° Mag/pu Phase/°
1’ 0.1135 41.4284 0 0 0 0
2’ 0 0 0 0 0 0
3’ 0 0 0 0 0 0
4’ 0.0669 41.4284 0 0 0 0
Table 4.6: Multiple Sources to Multiple Sources Reactive Current Tracing on the
Power Line
Current Source 1 2 3
Mag/pu Phase/° Mag/pu Phase/° Mag/pu Phase/°
1’ 0 0 0.3744 -48.5716 0.0989 -48.5716
2’ 0 0 0 0 0 0
3’ 0 0 0.6246 -48.5716 0.1651 -48.5716
4’ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 4.7: Multiple Sources to Multiple Sources Current Tracing on the Power
Line
Current Source 1 2 3
Mag/pu Phase/° Mag/pu Phase/° Mag/pu Phase/°
1’ 0.1135 41.4284 0.3744 -48.5716 0.0989 -48.5716
2’ 0 0 0 0 0 0
3’ 0 0 0.6246 -48.5716 0.1651 -48.5716
4’ 0.0669 41.4284 0 0 0 0
all of the decomposed currents in Table 4.7 is equal to the line current I⃗L. This
proves the effectiveness of the proposed current tracing method such that it does
not violate any physical or electrical laws.
The results of multiple sources to multiple sources equivalent resistance, re-
actance and impedance on the power line calculated by Eq. (4.41), (4.42) and
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(4.43) are shown in Table 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10, respectively.
Table 4.8: Multiple Sources to Multiple Sources Equivalent Resistance on the
Power Line
Current Source 1 2 3
pu pu pu
1’ 0.3972 ∞ ∞
2’ ∞ ∞ ∞
3’ ∞ ∞ ∞
4’ 0.6744 ∞ ∞
Table 4.9: Multiple Sources to Multiple Sources Equivalent Reactance on the
Power Line
Current Source 1 2 3
pu pu pu
1’ ∞ 0.1205 0.4559
2’ ∞ ∞ ∞
3’ ∞ 0.0722 0.2733
4’ ∞ ∞ ∞
Table 4.10: Multiple Sources to Multiple Sources Equivalent Impedance on the
Power Line
Current Source 1 2 3
pu pu pu
1’ 0.3972 0.1205j 0.4559j
2’ ∞ ∞ ∞
3’ ∞ 0.0722j 0.2733j
4’ 0.6744 ∞ ∞
In Table 4.8-4.10, the “∞ ” stands for no equivalent resistance, reactance or
impedance exists between the two current sources. In this case, the decomposed
current between the two current sources is zero. The decomposed currents shown
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in Table 4.7 multiplied by the corresponding impedance in Table 4.10 are exactly
equal to the voltage difference between bus 1 and bus 2. This also proves the
effectiveness of the proposed current tracing method such that it does not violate
any physical or electrical laws.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, a current tracing method is proposed to model the distribution
grid. Unlike the traditional grid model where currents are congested on the bus
and flowing through the power line, an equivalent circuit model is developed,
where currents are flowing through several parallel connected lines. The equiv-
alent circuit provides a detailed current flowing route from each current source
to each load on the power line, regardless of the bidirectional power flow. The
developed model has sufficient detailed information which could potentially be




Fault Current Tracing for
Primary Protection
5.1 Introduction
To address the aforementioned practical problems such as relay sensitivity and
blinding of protection issues, a current tracing model was proposed in the previous
chapter. This method has enhanced circuit information of the current flows on the
power line from each of the individual current source connected to the grid. With
this more detailed current flow information, the contribution of each individual
current source to the fault current can be clearly identified. This chapter will
demonstrate the application of this technique in improving dependability and
sensitivity of the primary protection considering multiple DERs in a distribution
feeder.
Thus, the main objectives of this chapter are as follows. First, it will be shown,
for the first time, how the accuracy of implementing artificial intelligence (AI)
algorithms on such a detailed grid model can be improved. Specifically, imple-
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menting the support vector machine (SVM) algorithm on the proposed current
tracing model is explored. Second, in addition to using fault current flows as the
only input feature, the decomposed current information to expand the dimension
of the feature space is explored. Finally, the performance of the combination of
current tracing method with the SVM is demonstrated in the practical scenario of
fault identification with DERs operating in distribution grids. Specifically, this
work shows how applying this hybrid method can improve sensitivity in detecting
very low level faults.
5.2 Support Vector Machine and Current Trac-
ing Kernel
5.2.1 Binary Classification Problem Formation
Given a set of power line current measurements Z = {zi, i = 1...n}, zi ∈ Rm that
may or may not contain fault current and the set of labels Y = {yi, i = 1...n},
yi ∈ {0, 1}, m stands for the dimension of the measurement, and n is the number
of observations. The fault current identification problem can be modeled as a
binary classification problem by establishing the connection between the above






yi = 1 indicates that the ith current measurement is fault current, or, alternatively,
there are no fault currents for yi = −1.
99
5.2.2 Support Vector Classifiers
The general idea of binary classification is to use input data to classify faults
or abnormal conditions from normal ones by generating an optimal hyper-plane.
In a p dimensional space, a hyper-plane is a flat affine subspace of hyper-plane
dimension p− 1. The hyper-plane in 2-D space is a line as shown in Fig. 5.1￿
Figure 5.1: Hyper-plane
Figure 5.2: Maximum Margin
Figure 5.3: SVM hyper-plane and its maximum margin
For a p dimensional space, a hyper-plane is defined by the equation
ωZ + ω0 = 0, (5.2)
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for parameters ω = [ω0, ω1, ...ωp]T and ω0. A separating hyper-plane has the
property that
yi(ω
T zi + ω0) > 0. (5.3)
In a linearly separable classification problem, there exists an infinite number
of hyper-planes as shown in Fig. 5.1. The objective is to find the maximal
margin hyper-plane that has the greatest minimum distance between the training
observations and the hyper-plane. The maximum margin hyper-plane is shown
in Fig. 5.2.
The two rectangles and the circle that lie on the dashed lines in Fig. 5.2 are
defined as the support vectors. The two dashed lines are defined as the positive
and negative hyper-plane respectively such that
ω0 + ω
TZP = 1, (5.4)
ω0 + ω
TZN = −1, (5.5)
where ZP is the subset of Z whose labels are positive, i.e. y = 1, alternatively,
ZN represents the negative subset of Z.
Subtracting Eq. (5.4) from Eq. (5.5) yields
ωT (ZP − ZN) = 2. (5.6)






Therefore, Eq. (5.6) is rewritten as






The left side of Eq. (5.8) is the distance or margin between the positive and
negative hyper-plane. Therefore, the objective function of SVM is to find the
maximum value of 2
||ω||
or the minimum value of 1
2
||ω|| which is subject to the
constraint that the samples are classified correctly. With the positive and negative
hyper-plane, the constraint could further be written as
yi(ωzi + ω0) ≥ 1. (5.9)
To relax the constraint, a slack variable ξi is introduced resulting in
ω0 + ω
T zi ≥ 1− ξi if yi = 1, (5.10)
ω0 + ω
T zi ≤ ξi − 1 if yi = −1. (5.11)
The classification problem is reformatted into the optimization problem in [67].








where C is used to control the penalty of misclassification, such that a smaller
value of C corresponds to less strictness of misclassification errors.
102
5.2.3 Support Vector Machines
As an extension of the support vector classifier, SVM is established by enlarging
the feature space using kernel. Kernel is a function that is used to quantify the
similarity of two observations. It generally transforms the training set of data
into a higher number of dimension spaces. There are many ways to define the






where zi and zi′ are the two observations, and zi,j and zi′,j are the observations
on jth dimension. Sometimes, faults and normal conditions are non-separable
using the linear kernel function. In these cases, the non-linear kernel can be used
such that the non-separable binary classification problem can become separable
in a higher dimension space. Some commonly used non-linear kernels are [67]




• Radial kernel: K(zi, zi′) = exp(−γ
∑j=1
m (xi,j − xi′,j)2)
where γ and d are positive constants and r is a constant.
5.2.4 Proposed Current Tracing Kernel
In [68], the author applied principle component analysis to select the features with
the highest information content to identify faults. This study concluded that the
top three features for fault identification were reactive power, real power, and an-
gle of voltage. Interestingly, current was not one of them. The author concluded
that with all three of the selected features, the accuracy of identification is almost
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96%. With all of the six features, i.e., the above features plus magnitude and an-
gle of current and magnitude of voltage, the accuracy of identification is no more
than 97%. Most feeder protection relays in the distribution system only operate
based on current information and therefore practically is the most appropriate
quantity to expand upon. The other quantities require more instrumentation and
cost to measure voltage and current in each phase.
In the proposed approach, decomposed current is used as the only feature to
identify the fault current. Without current tracing, the feature space consists of
only the line current magnitude and angle.
Based on Equations (4.20)–(4.23), the line current can be decomposed into
several decomposed currents flowing through virtual impedance lines as shown
earlier in Fig. 4.6. The feature space of line currents can be enlarged by using
the decomposed currents:
K(IL, e
j(ψ−θ)) = I⃗LRjP + I⃗LXjP , (5.14)
whereK represents the positive part of the linear mapping from power line current
to the decomposed current as shown in Eq. 4.30-4.33. Unlike the polynomial
kernel and the radial kernel, when the current tracing kernel is used, the feature
space of the fault current becomes more clear. That is, it provides the detailed
contribution of fault current from each current source to the power line.
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5.3 SVM Simulation Results
5.3.1 Current Tracing Kernel Results
In this simulation, the proposed current tracing kernel is applied to the same
single line system as that of Fig. 4.7. Both sides of the single line have a group
of DERs and loads, and bus 2 is connected directly to the external distribution
grid. All of the loads are of a constant power type, and the DERs are static
generators. The parameters are given in the format of active and reactive power
which is different from Chapter 4.
The current sources parameters are listed in Table 5.1. DERs that connect
to bus 1 cannot support the AC loads attached to bus 1 so that the currents
flow from bus 2 to bus 1, which is opposite from the case shown in a companion
paper [69]. Bus 2 is selected as the reference bus and the single power line is 20
km long with a series impedance of 0.121 + j0.107 Ω/km.
Table 5.1: The current source parameters.











In Table 5.1, the positive elements indicate an absorption of power whereas
negative elements represents generating power. The third current source attached
to bus 2 is the external grid and is calculated by the power flow. Equations (4.20)
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and (4.21) are applied to find the decomposed current on the power line from each
bus as shown in Table 5.2. All of the decomposed currents are listed in per unit
value. The decomposed current magnitude and phase in radians are selected as
the kernel for fault current identification.
Table 5.2: Current tracing results with Equations (4.20)–(4.23).
Bus Current Source Active Current Reactive Current
Mag Phase/° Mag Phase/°
1
1’ 0 0 0 0
2’ 0 0 0 0
3’ 5.3677 13.5251 5.6267 −76.4749
4’ 3.8535 13.5251 2.5276 −76.4749
2
1 0 0 0 0
2 3.5366 13.5251 3.6588 −76.4749
3 5.6847 13.5251 4.4955 −76.4749
In Table 5.2, a zero value indicates that the corresponding current source does
not contribute to the current on the power line. It can be observed that the zero
value occurs at bus 1; Current Sources 1 and 2; and bus 2, Current Source 1.
This does not violate common sense as these are all labeled as loads that are
consuming active and reactive power and do not contribute to the power line
current. Moreover, all of the decomposed active currents have the same phase
angle regardless of how the power is flowed from bus 1 or bus 2 in either direction.
The same rationale applies to the reactive currents. This is also consistent with
the fact that the voltages applied on the buses do not change when the current is
decomposed into its decomposed components. The reactive current is 90 degrees
out of phase from the active current, which complies with Equations (4.20) and
(4.21).
It is observed that, if all of the decomposed currents from the same bus are
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summed, the result is equivalent to the total power line current. This proves the
equivalence of the current tracing theory as the decomposed current will not lose
or generate new currents in addition to the line current.
5.3.2 SVM Results
In distribution systems with DERs, the fault current can be very small, as
inverter-based DERs can only produce exceptionally small fault current contri-
butions due to inverter current limiting action. Moreover, injected currents on
different loads are continuously fluctuating in the normal condition. To obtain
representative currents in the single line system, sample noises are injected to the
specified load powers in Table 5.1 and the power flow is recalculated to obtain the
decomposed current. This process is then repeated to obtain the load profile and
a continuous currents curve. The injected noise follows the normal distribution
such that,
X ∼ N(µ, σ2), (5.15)
where X represents active or reactive power sample noises; µ represents the av-
erage of the sample noises, which is set to 0; and σ stands for the standard
deviation, which is set to 0.1. All of the sample noises are independent from each
other. The sample noises were injected cumulatively to the loads such that the
kth point on the load profile is









where Pk and Qk represent the active and reactive power of the kth point of the
load profile, respectively; P and Q represent the given active and reactive power
(Table 5.1); and Xpi and Xqi stand for the ith active or reactive power sample
noises, respectively.
This process is repeated 500 times, and all of the parameters that are used for
current tracing and SVM training purposes are recorded. In addition to sample
noises, a small fault is also injected by increasing the active power consumption of
bus 1, with current source 3 increased by 10% and the reactive power decreased
by 10% of the same current source. Again, the process is repeated 500 times,
and all parameters are recorded. Only the decomposed current on the power line
from bus 2 side is used as the current tracing kernel; however, it is the same as if
the decomposed current from bus 1 side was used as the current tracing kernel,
as in the authored conference paper [69]. The first 500 parameters are taken as
normal condition, i.e., yi = −1, and the last 500 parameters are considered as
fault condition, i.e., yi = 1. The hyper-parameter C is set to be 1. This is selected
by the grid search method: comparing the performance of the SVM method with
different hyper-parameter from the list: [0.01, 0.1, 1, 10]. Only the one that has
the best performance is used. The performance is evaluated by the confusion
matrix which will be introduced shortly.
Seventy percent of the parameters are randomly selected as the training data,
and the remaining 30% are taken as the testing data. In this work, the non-
waveform phasor current information is used for the fault identification problem.
Other alternative measurement data have been considered in other research, such
as exploiting sub-cycle waveform distortion features in pattern recognition algo-
rithms as a part of the identification process [70, 71].
The confusion matrix is used to represent the testing results as defined in [72].
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The f-score, recall, and precision parameters are used to evaluate the performance













where tp, fp, tn, and fn represent true positive, false positive, true negative, and
false negative, respectively.
To show the advantage of using the current tracing kernel, the fault current
identification results using different feature spaces is compared. First, only the
power line current I⃗L is used as the feature space. Then, the polynomial kernel,
radial kernel, and current tracing kernel are added as the expanded feature space.
All of the confusion matrices are calculated based on the same training and
testing data. The confusion matrices and the performance based on the confusion
matrices are shown in Tables 5.3 and 5.4, respectively.
Table 5.3: Confusion matrix using different feature spaces.
Feature Space Fault Normal
No Kernel Predict Fault tp = 90 fp = 61Predict Normal fn = 13 tn = 136
Polynomial Kernel Predict Fault tp = 100 fp = 51Predict Normal fn = 19 tn = 130
Radial Kernel Predict Fault tp = 95 fp = 56Predict Normal fn = 16 tn = 133
Current Tracing Kernel Predict Fault tp = 145 fp = 6Predict Normal fn = 0 tn = 149
It is clearly seen that among all the feature spaces used, the current tracing
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Table 5.4: Performance using different feature spaces.
Feature Space Precision Recall f1-Score
No Kernel 0.596 0.874 0.709
Polynomial Kernel 0.662 0.840 0.74
Radial Kernel 0.629 0.856 0.725
Current Tracing Kernel 0.96 1 0.98
kernel has the best performance. All three performance parameters are signif-
icantly higher than the other feature spaces that were used. The recall value
equals 1, which indicates that when there is a fault current on the power line,
the SVM method using current tracing kernel will definitely detect it. In addi-
tion, the polynomial kernel and radial kernel have a better performance than if
only I⃗L is used as feature space. However, the performance parameters do not
increase significantly. When compared with the results shown in [68], which have
97% overall accuracy, the overall current tracing kernel result in this paper has
improved, i.e., an f1-score value of 98%. This indicates that the current trac-
ing kernel can slightly improve the sensitivity and dependability of the primary
protection.
5.4 EMTP-MATLAB Simulation Results and Dis-
cussion
The result is further validated in the EMTP simulation platform. The simulation
circuit is the same as shown earlier in Fig. 3.27. If the fault happens at the same
location, the primary protection is R2 with R1 as the backup protection. In this
case, the fault current could be identified by tracing the fault current contribution
of current source S1_1, S1_2 and S1_3 on the left hand side or S2_1 and S2_2 on
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the right hand side. Only the result of current tracing from the left hand side is
shown as an example here.
The current tracing method is first implemented in a MATLAB Simulink
































The platform consists of three blocks. The current aggregation block is used
to aggregate the collected polar phasor data of each current source and convert
it into the rectangular form in real time. The output of these two blocks are the
aggregated real time currents.
The single line block is used for the multiple sources to grid current tracing.
It takes in the real time currents from the current aggregation block, the voltages
and the constant value of the line impedance. The output of this block is the
decomposed currents from Eq. (4.20-4.21).
In the tripping logic block, a threshold based tripping logic is used. This block
takes in the decomposed current from the single line block. Once the decomposed
current is beyond a given percentage of the rated decomposed current, the trip
signal will be activated. Thus one of the outputs of this block is the tripping
signal. In addition, the sum of the decomposed currents from the single line
block is also included as the output of this block. This can be used to verify if it
is equal to the line current I⃗L and prove the correctness of the algorithm.
Due to the availability of the fault current data, a threshold based tripping
logic is used in the tripping logic block. The threshold is set to be 1.5 times of the
rated decomposed current. The tripping time is set to be instantaneous for the
simulation, but it could be adjusted based on the IDMT curve of the decomposed
currents. Therefore, once the decomposed current is above the threshold, the
tripping logic block will send a trip signal immediately.
The MATLAB-Simulink platform is integrated using the C++ compiler and
a DLL file is generated. The DLL file can be imported into the EMTP’s Simulink
DLL interface which can be used to customized the algorithm for power system
protection. Thus, an integrated EMTP-MATLAB simulation platform is gener-
























It can be observed that the EMTP-MATLAB primary protection interface
takes in the positive sequence value of current sources, voltage angle and the line
current. The current measurements of each current sources have to follow the
principle such that the positive pole of the current meter that connects to the
same bus are always pointing towards the same direction: either from current
sources to the bus or the opposite. The trip signal goes into a “set reset latch
flip flop” block. This is to guarantee that the once the trip signal goes from -1
to 1, the output of the flip-flop will maintain its value to 1. Thus the trip signal
will keep the breaker open. However, in order to observe the fault current and its
related impacts, the trip signal is set to be observed in a scope, but not connected
to the breaker.
In the following sections, the EMTP-MATLAB primary protection interface
using the developed current tracing analytics is evaluated based on the fault
type under different levels of DERs penetration. All of the measured values are
positive sequence values. The DER injection or penetration level is set to increase
from 5 panels to 20 panels using 5 panels increments each time. Each panel has
a rated power of 1.67 MVA. The rest of the simulation settings are almost the
same to that of Section 3.4.2. The total simulation time is 3 seconds with a time
step of 10−5 second. A fault is programmed to occur at 1.5 seconds. The fault
is controlled by the EMTP fault block which can generate all types of resistive
faults. For example, when the switch between phase A and ground is closed at
1.5 seconds, a LG fault happens.
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5.4.1 LG Fault Results and Explanation
The voltage magnitude and angle of both buses are shown in Fig. 5.6 and 5.7.
(a) Voltage V1 magnitude
(b) Voltage V1 angle
Figure 5.6: Primary protection voltage on bus 1 of distribution feeder protection
circuit with LG fault under different level of DER penetration
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(a) Voltage V2 magnitude
(b) Voltage V2 angle
Figure 5.7: Primary protection voltage on bus 2 of distribution feeder protection
circuit with LG fault under different level of DER penetration
It takes 0.4 second for the DERs to be initialized. Voltage magnitude on both
side drops significantly due to the fault. The current magnitude and angle of
each sources that connects to bus 1 are shown in Fig. 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10.
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(a) Current source S1_1 magnitude
(b) Current source S1_1 angle
Figure 5.8: Primary protection current source 1 on bus 1 of distribution feeder
protection circuit with LG fault under different level of DER penetration
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(a) Current source S1_2 magnitude
(b) Current source S1_2 angle
Figure 5.9: Primary protection current source 2 on bus 1 of distribution feeder
protection circuit with LG fault under different level of DER penetration
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(a) Current source S1_3 magnitude
(b) Current source S1_3 angle
Figure 5.10: Primary protection current source 3 on bus 1 of distribution feeder
protection circuit with LG fault under different level of DER penetration
It can be observed that the DER current magnitude S1_3 increases while the
DER penetration rate increases before and after the fault happens at 1.5 seconds.
However, the magnitude of fault from all penetration levels of DER does not
change very much at 1.5 seconds. The current magnitude from infinite bus S1_1
and load S1_2 increase and decrease, respectively.
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The current sets in Eq. (4.14) and (4.15) are shown in Fig. 5.11, 5.12 and
5.13. In these figures, ILR1, ILR2 and ILR3 belong to ΩRM and ILX1, ILX2 and
ILX3 belong to ΩXM .
(a) Active current ILR1
(b) Reactive current ILX1
Figure 5.11: Active and reactive currents from current source 1 on bus 1 to the
power line with LG fault under different level of DER penetration
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(a) Active current ILR2
(b) Reactive current ILX2
Figure 5.12: Active and reactive currents from current source 2 on bus 1 to the
power line with LG fault under different level of DER penetration
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(a) Active current ILR3
(b) Reactive current ILX3
Figure 5.13: Active and reactive currents from current source 3 on bus 1 to the
power line with LG fault under different level of DER penetration
It can be observed from the above figures that in active current magnitude set
ΩRM , the decomposed current ILR2 is also the only magnitude that is negative.
The decomposed current ILX2 is the only magnitude that is negative in reactive
current magnitude set ΩXM . Thus current source S1_2 does not contribute to
the line current IL. This is obvious since S1_2 is an AC load. It can also be
observed that the DER decomposed current magnitude ILR3 is increasing while
123
the penetration level of DER is varied after the fault happens. This demonstrates
the key advantage of applying the current tracing method in protection relays in
that the decomposed fault current signature is more significant compared to the
regular fault current measurement where the contribution of DERs does not have
any significant effect.
The magnitude and angle of decomposed current from each individual current
source to the distribution line are shown in Fig. 5.14, 5.15 and 5.16.
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(a) Magnitude of decomposed current from S1_1
(b) Angle of decomposed current from S1_1
Figure 5.14: Decomposed current from current source 1 on bus 1 to the power
line with LG fault under different levels of DER penetration
According to Eq. (4.20) and (4.21), the negative currents in Fig. 5.15 are zero.
Thus, the decomposed current magnitude and angle from S1_2 is zero. It also
can be observed that the magnitude of decomposed current from S1_3 increases
significantly when a fault occurs. This means that the method can clearly identify
the fault current contribution from DERs compared to the current measurements
where the fault current contribution from DERs are non-distinguishable before
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(a) Magnitude of decomposed current from S1_2
(b) Angle of decomposed current from S1_2
Figure 5.15: Decomposed current from current source 2 on bus 1 to the power
line with LG fault under different levels of DER penetration
and after the fault.
Moreover, the magnitude of decomposed current from S1_1 are more than dou-
bled after faults for each level of DERs penetration. Compared to the measured
current increments where the magnitude is doubled, the decomposed current mag-
nitude is more suitable to be the fault current identification signature. Therefore,
using the decomposed current instead of the measured current for the primary
126
(a) Magnitude of decomposed current from S1_3
(b) Angle of decomposed current from S1_3
Figure 5.16: Decomposed current from current source 3 on bus 1 to the power
line with LG fault under different levels of DER penetration
protection can significantly increase the sensitivity of the over current relay.
The line current IL and the current sum after decomposition are shown in
Fig. 5.17. It can be observed that both magnitude and the angle of line current
IL and the current sum after decomposition under different levels of penetration
rate are overlapped with each other. This proves the correctness of this method
as no physical or electrical laws are broken.
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(a) Magnitude of IL and the sum of decomposed current
(b) Angle of IL and the sum of decomposed current
Figure 5.17: Comparison between IL and the sum of decomposed current of
primary protection with LG fault under different levels of DER penetration rate
The trip signals are shown in Fig. 5.18. The EMTP-MATLAB primary
protection interface trips for all levels of DER penetration as expected.
More supporting simulation results, such as LL, LLG, LLL and LLLG faults
under different levels of DER penetration, are presented in the Appendix B.
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Figure 5.18: EMTP-MATLAB primary protection interface trip signal
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, the current tracing method is applied to a realistic simulation of a
distribution feeder with DERs for the purpose of demonstrating a new protection
relaying approach for the primary protection. The decomposed current provides
sufficient details and sensitivity for identifying faults and abnormal conditions in
the distribution feeder. With these details, the feature space of the power line
current is enlarged through the “current tracing kernel”. That is, the decomposed
current is used along with the power line current as the expanded feature space
to identify the fault current which is a departure from existing methods. In
addition, the results proved and demonstrated the proposed method on a single
power line distribution system, and the SVM method’s performance is evaluated
and compared by using different kernel methods. The results indicate that with
the benefits of the proposed current tracing kernel, the SVM method is enhanced
with more sensitivity and dependability to very low level faults compared to the
commonly used kernels such as polynomial kernel and radial kernel.
Moreover, the multiple sources to power line current tracing method is realized
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through the MATLAB-Simulink integrated simulation package. For the first time,
the results show that both the magnitude of the decomposed current from DER
and infinite bus are increased significantly compared to the measured current
magnitude that is ordinarily used in protection relaying. The main contribution is
that the proposed method provides a new set of features that can be decomposed
and exploited for added sensitivity in primary protection relaying schemes in
distribution feeders. Furthermore, the new approach makes use of existing sensing




Fault Current Tracing for
Backup Protection
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, the current tracing method is proven to be effective
for increasing the dependability and sensitivity of the primary protection. In
a protection scheme, coordination must be maintained such that the when the
primary protection fails to pick up, the backup protection has to be sensitive
enough to see faults for an adjacent or more zones, which can be challenging if
the fault current is lower. Failing to react to the fault that is not isolated by the
primary protection can cause severe problems. When the fault is not removed in
time, a LG fault could become a three phase LLLG fault. In an extreme situation,
if all of the backup protection relays fails to trip, it will lead to a cascading failure
from a local distribution feeder to the entire substation.
On the other end of the spectrum, bidirectional power flow will lead to the
malfunction of the existing backup protection scheme in distribution networks
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that are designed for single direction power flow from the substation to the loads.
Chapter 3 has already introduced the impact of DERs to distribution network
backup protection. The issue caused by the injection of DERs to distribution
network is that it will reduce the sensitivity of the upper stream relay to the
fault current, causing increased relay operating time delays, or, in a worst case
not, not reacting at all to the downstream faults if the primary protection fails.
A good relay backup protection scheme should consider the impact caused by
the injection of DERs, including the bidirectional flow and the lower sensitivity of
the protection system. Using adaptive schemes have been proposed to overcome
this, but are not immune to the issues discussed. Therefore, this chapter is
mainly focusing on exploring the implementation of current tracing method to
solve aforementioned problems in distribution networks.
6.2 Fault Current Tracing for Backup Protec-
tion
The system diagram of the distribution circuit that is being simulated for demon-
strating backup protection performance is shown in Fig. 6.1.
Figure 6.1: Distribution Feeder Protection with DERs while R2 is disabled
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In Fig. 6.1, relay R2 is disabled such that it will not pickup when a fault
happens in its zone downstream. Thus it is intentionally marked as red in the
diagram. Based on Eq. (4.34) and Eq. (4.36), a decomposed current can be
derived from current source S1_1 to S2_2. This decomposed current describes the
amount of fault current contribution from distribution grid to the fault current.
Thus this backup protection issue can be converted to a primary protection issue
using the decomposed current as a substitute of the measured current. R1 and
R2 can also be coordinated through this decomposed current using the IDMT
curve.
6.3 EMTP-MATLAB Simulation Results and Anal-
ysis
Based on Eq. (4.20 - 4.21), Eq. (4.34) and Eq. (4.36), the current tracing
algorithm for backup protection is implemented in a MATLAB Simulink platform.
The diagram is shown in Fig. 6.2, which consists of seven blocks.
The two current aggregation and single line blocks are the same control blocks
that were implemented in Chapter 5 primary protection results
The current verification block is used to verify the current tracing results
from each single line block and make sure the result is correct. This is realized
by comparing the sum of the decomposed currents from the two single line block.
Theoretically, they should equal to the line current I⃗L.
The single line dissection block is the multiple sources to multiple sources
current tracing block. This block takes in the output decomposed currents from
the two single line blocks. The output of this block are the multiple sources to
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multiple sources current tracing results including the decomposed currents. Only
the decomposed current are used for the tripping logic block.
The tripping logic block is almost the same control block that was imple-
mented in Chapter 6 primary protection results, except that it takes in the de-












































The EMTP-MATLAB simulation is shown in Fig. 6.3.
In Fig. 6.3, the trip signal is connected to a “set reset latch flip flop” block
which is the same to Fig. 5.5. The “set reset latch flip flop” block is also not
connected to the breaker, so that the fault current can be observed.
The EMTP-MATLAB backup protection interface is evaluated based on the
fault type under different levels of DERs penetration. All of the measured values



























6.3.1 LG Fault Results and Discussion
The decomposed currents from each individual current source on bus 1 to each
individual current source on bus 2 are shown in Fig. 6.4-6.9. The measurement
voltage and current information are neglected here as they are the same to that
of Chapter 5.
It can be observed from Fig. 6.4, the current magnitude Ωin_out_mag_1_1 from
distribution grid to current source 1 that is connected to bus 2 decreases when
the number of SPV increases. Oppositely, in Fig. 6.6, the current magnitude
Ωin_out_mag_3_1 from SPV to current source S2_1 increases when the number of
SPV increases. This is obvious as the total power consumption of the loads is not
changing, and more numbers of SPV will lead to less power consumption from
the distribution feeder. When a fault occurs at 1.5 seconds, both Ωin_out_mag_1_1
and Ωin_out_mag_3_1 decreases as current source 1 that is connected to bus 2 does
not have any fault on it. As a load, current source S1_2 does not contribute any
current to the other current sources, thus Ωin_out_mag_2_1 is always 0.
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(a) Magnitude of Ω_in_out_mag_1_1
(b) Angle of Ω_in_out_rad_1_1
Figure 6.4: Decomposed current between current source 1 on bus 1 to current
source 1 on bus 2 with LG fault under different level of DER penetration rate
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(a) Magnitude of Ω_in_out_mag_2_1
(b) Angle of Ω_in_out_rad_2_1
Figure 6.5: Decomposed current between current source 2 on bus 1 to current
source 1 on bus 2 with LG fault under different level of DER penetration rate
140
(a) Magnitude of Ω_in_out_mag_3_1
(b) Angle of Ω_in_out_rad_3_1
Figure 6.6: Decomposed current between current source 3 on bus 1 to current
source 1 on bus 2 with LG fault under different level of DER penetration rate
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(a) Magnitude of Ω_in_out_mag_1_2
(b) Angle of Ω_in_out_rad_1_2
Figure 6.7: Decomposed current between current source 1 on bus 1 to current
source 2 on bus 2 with LG fault under different level of DER penetration rate
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(a) Magnitude of Ω_in_out_mag_2_2
(b) Angle of Ω_in_out_rad_2_2
Figure 6.8: Decomposed current between current source 2 on bus 1 to current
source 2 on bus 2 with LG fault under different level of DER penetration rate
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(a) Magnitude of Ω_in_out_mag_3_2
(b) Angle of Ω_in_out_rad_3_2
Figure 6.9: Decomposed current between current source 3 on bus 1 to current
source 2 on bus 2 with LG fault under different level of DER penetration rate
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In Fig. 6.7, the current magnitude Ωin_out_mag_1_2 from distribution grid S1_1
to current source S2_2 decreases when the number of SPV and the decomposed
current Ωin_out_mag_3_2 increases. Similar to Fig. 6.4, this is due to the fact
that total power consumption is not changing. When a LG fault is initiated
at 1.5 seconds, the decomposed current Ωin_out_mag_1_2 increased from 80-140
A to 480-650 A, which is about five to six times its rated decomposed current.
Whereas in Fig. 3.39, the measured current magnitude from current source S1_1
increased from 700 A to 1000 A, which is about 1.42 times its rated current.
Compared to Fig. 3.39 that uses current measurement for backup protection,
the decomposed current magnitude Ωin_out_mag_1_2 has a more significant fault
current signature. Thus it greatly increases the sensitivity and dependability of
the backup protection. With the significant increases of the decomposed current
Ωin_out_mag_1_2, R1 will be sensitive enough to see LG fault at the downstream
of R2. Thus the blinding of protection issue can be solved. In addition, R1 and
R2 can be coordinated through the IDMT curve using the decomposed current
Ωin_out_mag_1_2 to determine the trip time. In this simulation, relay R1 is set
to trip instantaneously. In addition, it is not needed to shift the IDMT curve
compared to the adaptive relay scheme since the decomposed current received by
the primary protection relay is the same to that of the backup protection relay.
Likewise, the measured current magnitude from the SPV current source S1_3
in Fig. 3.41 have very little change before and after fault inception at 1.5 seconds.
Whereas, the decomposed current Ωin_out_mag_3_2 in Fig. 6.9 increases from 50-
200 A to 200-430 A, which is about two times its rated decomposed current. In
this case, if a new relay R3 is placed at current source S1_3, the decomposed
current Ωin_out_mag_3_2 can be used to coordinate R3 and R2 without any issue
of the relay blinding.
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It can be observed from Fig. 6.5 and 6.8 that the magnitude and angle
between two loads are always zero. This is obvious as there are no decomposed
currents existing between loads.
The other angle information does not have any practical meaning in the pro-
posed backup protection coordination scheme in this thesis. However, the angle
information together with the decomposed current magnitude shown in Fig. 6.4-
6.9 can be used to demonstrate that the sum of the decomposed currents between
multiple current sources add up to the power line current I⃗L, thus verifying the
correctness of the algorithm. The result is shown in Fig. 6.10.
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(a) Magnitude of IL and the sum of the decomposed current between multiple current sources
(b) Angle of IL and the sum of the decomposed current between multiple current sources
Figure 6.10: Magnitude and angle of IL and the sum of the decomposed current
between multiple current sources
It is observed from Fig. 6.10 that both magnitude and the angle of the line cur-
rent IL and the sum of the decomposed current between multiple current sources
under different levels of penetration of DERs are overlapped with each other.
This proves that the current tracing based EMTP-MATLAB backup protection
interface can be implemented in a real time protection system without violating
any physical or electrical laws.
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The EMTP-MATLAB backup protection interface trip signal is shown in Fig.
6.11. It can be observed that EMTP-MATLAB backup protection interface is
tripped for all levels of DERs penetration instantaneously. Thus the EMTP-
MATLAB backup protection interface is proved to be effective to overcome the
blinding of protection.
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Figure 6.11: EMTP-MATLAB backup protection interface trip signal
In addition to the results that shown above, the proposed EMTP-MATLAB
backup protection interface is not sensitive to the direction of the power flow.
The SPV or any kinds of DERs can be installed at either side of the buses and
no directional overrcurrent element is needed in the interface. Therefore, the
proposed technique is suitable for the bidirectional power flow situation.
Finally, the proposed backup protection scheme has the advantage over adap-
tive protection schemes proposed by others where the pickup threshold is varied
based on system operating conditions. Since the decomposed current has a more
significant fault current signature compared to the measured currents, the trip-
ping current thresholds can be set more simply to fixed settings. The decomposed
current can easily surpass the fixed threshold when a fault occurs. It is also not
necessary to consider the coordination between the backup protection relay and
the backup of the backup protection relay at the same time. This is because
the decomposed current is only derived between the two adjacent primary and
backup protection relays.
Additional simulation results considering LL, LLG, LLL and LLLG faults
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under different levels of DERs penetration rate, are listed in the Appendix C.
6.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, a backup protection scheme is proposed based on the multiple
current sources to multiple current sources current tracing method. Instead of
using the measured current, the proposed backup protection scheme uses the
decomposed currents between each individual current source to determine the trip
time from the IDMT curve. With the decomposed current, a direct virtual circuit
is established from the backup relay to where the fault happens. Therefore, the
backup protection coordination problem can be treated as a primary protection
problem with the proposed decomposed current tracing analytics. In addition,
the backup protection can also coordinate with the primary protection using the
same decomposed current.
The proposed method is realized and validated through the EMTP-MATLAB
simulation interface. The multiple current sources to multiple current sources cur-
rent tracing method is first implemented in the MATLAB Simulink and compiled
into a DLL file. The DLL file is then imported into the EMTP-MATLAB simula-
tion interface. The blinding of protection issue in Chapter 3 is reproduced again
in the simulation, but the traditional backup relay is replaced with the proposed
EMTP-MATLAB simulation interface.
The simulation is run under different levels of DER injection. The simula-
tion result shows that the proposed backup protection scheme works well under
different levels of DER penetration without any complications arising from the
bidirectional power flow issue. In addition, the decomposed currents have more
significant fault current signatures compared to traditionally measured currents
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in relays. This character makes the proposed backup protection outstanding from
the traditional backup protection in regard to its higher sensitivity and depend-
ability. Particularly, the blinding of protection issue can be solved through the
proposed backup protection scheme.
When compared to the adaptive relay protection scheme that is being heavily
promoted in literature, the proposed backup protection scheme has the advantage
of a fixed tripping current threshold. This may be more preferable to utilities
for regulation compliance that are used to protection relays with fixed pickups,
and may be wary of ambiguous thresholds that may change unexpectedly. In
addition, the proposed backup protection scheme does not need to consider the
coordination with any adjacent relays except with the primary relay. This can
greatly reduce the complexity of coordination when the system operating condi-
tions change with DER injection and network reconfiguration.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Works
7.1 Conclusion
The challenges associated with the impact of DERs to distribution network pro-
tection are addressed in this thesis with current tracing method and associated
derived methods. In this thesis, a detailed description of the analytical foundation
of fault current flow model is provided from a circuit principle perspective.
Unlike the traditional grid model, where current sources are congested on the
bus and the power flowing through the power line, an equivalent circuit model
is developed, where currents can flow through several parallel connected virtual
power lines, which are electrically and physically equivalent to the widely used
single power line model. Each parallel connected virtual power line is established
based on the current contribution of each current source to the power line, known
as the decomposed current. In addition, the contribution of currents between each
individual current source is also provided in the form of parallel connected virtual
power lines, which also follow electrical and physical principles. These equivalent
power lines provide the possibility of relieving or eliminating the impact of DERs
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to distribution network protection on the basis of only using decomposed currents
as the fault signature.
The detailed foundation of current tracing method is described in Chapter
4 which is demonstrated and validated with MATLAB simulations. The theo-
retical derivation and simulation results show the mathematical correctness of
the current tracing method, given the off-line synchronized current and voltage
measurement data.
With the off-line synchronized current and voltage measurement data, a SVM
based machine learning method is introduced in Chapter 5. The SVM method’s
performance is evaluated and compared by using the proposed current tracing
kernel, polynomial kernel, and radial kernel methods. The results indicate that
with the current tracing kernel, the SVM method is enhanced with more sensi-
tivity and dependability to very low level faults compared to polynomial kernel
and radial kernel. Further, EMTP-MATLAB primary protection interface is
developed and for the first time, the current tracing method is implemented in
power system primary protection relaying using the EMTP-MATLAB simulation
platform with real time synchronized measurement data. The simulation results
indicate that the decomposed currents have a more significant signature com-
pared to measured currents when a fault happens. This also indicates that the
proposed EMTP-MATLAB primary protection interface has higher sensitivity
and dependability in regard to primary protection.
The power system backup protection is shown in Chapter 6. Through multi-
ple current sources to multiple current sources current tracing, for the first time,
the proposed EMTP-MATLAB backup protection interface is developed, which
could identify the fault current contribution for the upstream relay. The simula-
tion results indicate that the EMTP-MATLAB backup protection interface could
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increase the sensitivity and dependability of the backup protection. The results
strongly suggest that the blinding of relay issue can be completely avoided. The
work is a departure from current research trends exploring adaptive relay protec-
tion schemes. The proposed EMTP-MATLAB backup protection interface has
fixed tripping current thresholds and it does not need to consider the coordination
with any adjacent relays except the primary relay. Therefore, less experiences
and work loads are expected from the designers when implementing the proposed
backup protection scheme.
7.2 Future Work
A few research directions are opened up in this thesis for future work.
In Chapter 4, the capacitance of the distribution line is neglected. Thus in the
current tracing method, no capacitance information is included. In the future,
the capacitance could be included, particularly for those long distribution feeders
or applications in transmission lines.
The impedance of the virtual parallel connected power lines is available from
the decomposed current. This could be used to develop and enhance the distance
protection relay performance.
Moreover, with the decomposed current, advanced machine learning or deep
learning method can be developed, not only for identifying the fault current but
also for predicting the fault current. The off-line learning can also be extend to
online learning.
Finally, since this method is proven to be effective on a small scale distribu-
tion network, extension of this work could be focused on the practical hardware
implementation of current tracing method on a larger scale distribution network.
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Appendix A
Real Time Distribution Network
Topology Identification
A.1 Graph Representation of Distribution Net-
work
Let G be a connected and directed graph such that
G = (V ,E ) (A.1)
where V = {v1, v2...vn} and E = {e1, e2...em} denoted as the set of vertex (or
node) and edge of graph G respectively. ek(vi, vj) denoted as the function of edge
ek leaves source vertex vi and entries terminal vertex vj. n = |V | and m = |E |
denoted as the number of vertexes and edges of graph G respectively.
With respect to these labelings, the incidence matrix M = (mkh) is defined as




1, if vh is the terminal vertex of ek.
−1, if vh is the source vertex of ek.
0, otherwise.
(A.2)
In this section, the distribution networks are modeled as graphs, where vertexes
represent the loads and transformer of the distribution network, the edges repre-
sent the distribution lines. Any two vertices in such a distribution network are
connected by exactly one path.
The Laplacian matrix, L = (lkh),L ∈ Rn×n, is defined as
L =MTM (A.3)
Mathematically, L can also be represented as
L = D −A (A.4)
where D is the degree matrix, D ∈ Rn×n, and A = (akh) is the adjacency matrix,
A ∈ Rn×n of graph G.
Take the square of Eq. (A.4), the following equation could get,
L2 = D2 −AD −DA+A2. (A.5)
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For easy and concise description, the sign structure matrix of a matrix T = (tkh),
T ∈ Rn×n is defined as S(T ) = (skh(T )) such that
skh(T ) =

1, if tkh is negative,
0, otherwise.
(A.6)
With respect to this labeling, the following equation could get,
S(L2) = S(−AD −DA). (A.7)
Since the degree matrix of a tree is positive-definite, the following equation could
get,
S(L2) = A. (A.8)
Therefore, the adjacency matrix could also be constructed from L2 matrix.
A.2 Voltage Expansion Model
Consider a distribution network of n vertices with node voltage phasor imple-
mented on each vertex. A collection of SCADA voltage magnitude is given by
|U | = {|u1|, |u2|, ...|uv|, ...} (A.9)
where |uv| ∈ Rn×1 is the magnitude of vth voltage measurement. The Taylor
Series expansion of |uv| with respect to the transformer voltage magnitude |UN |
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is defined in [73] such that







where sv is the conjugate of injective power at vth measurement, 1 ∈ Rn×1 such
that 1 = {1, 1, 1, ..., 1}, θ is the ratio of conductance /impedance (L/R ratio)
based on the assumption of uniformed inductance/resistance ratio, X represents
the impedance matrix of the network, dv(UN )
U2N
is the high order term of the Taylor
Series expansion which is bonded when |UN | goes to infinite.
A.2.1 Model of Topology Estimation
By neglecting the high order terms in Eq. (A.10), a covariance matrix Λ of |U |
can be expressed in the following simple clean form,
Λ = E[(|u| − E|u|)(|u| − E|u|)T ] = XΨX
U2N
(A.11)
where Ψ is the diagonal positive-definite matrix defined as,
Ψ = cosθ · diag(σ2pv) + sinθ · diag(σ2qv) (A.12)
where diag(σ2pv) and diag(σ2qv) are diagonal covariance matrices of active power
and reactive power of each vertex respectively based on the assumption of inde-
pendent injective power.
It is known that the impedance matrix X is the pseudo-inverse of admittance
matrix Y . The admittance matrix could be represented as
Y =MTW−1M = LW (A.13)
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where LW is the weighted Laplacian matrix, W = (wkh) is the diagonal positive
semi-definite matrix such that
wkh =

z−1(ek), if h = k.
0, otherwise.
(A.14)
where z(ek) is the impedance of edge ek.
In order to describe the relationship between SCADA voltages and the topological
structure in terms of covariance, the pseudoinverse of Λ is introduced and denoted
by K, which is also known as the concentration matrix of Λ.
K = U2NLWΨ†LW , (A.15)
where Ψ† is the diagonal pseudoinverse of Ψ, which is positive semi-definite.
Since Ψ† is a diagonal positive semi-definite matrix, W−1 is a diagonal positive
definite matrix, UN is a constant, the sign structure of K and L2 are the same.
Based on Eq. (A.8), the following equation could get,
S(L2) = S(K) = S(U2NLWΨ†LW ) = A. (A.16)
Therefore, the topology of the distribution network could be identified by locating
the negative entries in the K matrix.
A.2.2 Impact Variables on System Identification
At first glance, it seems that the K matrix has the same sign structure of L2
matrix, however, the identification process was carried out based on the following
assumptions and constrains which may restrict or even change the results of
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identification if they are not well followed:
• The L/R ratio of impedance of each cable of the distribution network are
assumed all the same, which is a strict constraint that hard to be reached.
• The injective power of every vertex is assumed to be independent to each
other, i.e. the changing of injective power of one vertex does not affect the
others, which also contradict to the case that the increasing temperature
of one block causes the increasing of injective power at all vertices within
the block where the injective powers are correlated.
• The high order term of |u| was neglected when constructing the Λ matrix,
which introduce errors in , where the sign structure of K changes, which
affects directly to the identification.
• The voltage at the transformer is assumed to be a constant fundamental
wave that the harmonic wave, which appears quite often in transformer, is
not considered. When there are harmonics, the impedance changes while
L/R ratio of each line differs dramatically.
Due to the possible impact of the assumptions used in the derivation of Eq.
(A.15), it is necessary to understand K matrix and analysis the possible errors
caused by violating the assumptions above. Since this chapter is mainly focus on
the modeling errors, it is assumed that there are no voltage measurement errors
and no harmonics in the distribution network.
A.3 Simulations of Impact of Modeling Errors
The voltage sample was collected on a 9-bus distribution network shown in Fig.
A.1.
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In order to avoid errors from measurement, the voltage set |U | is constructed
(a) Graph representation
(b) Electric representation
Figure A.1: The original 9-bus distribution network.
by calculating the power flows. The back-forward method is used to calculate
the power flow. To help us observe the modeling errors, the voltage magnitude
difference between two iterations is restricted to 10−8 to maintain the voltage set
|U | as accurate as possible.
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This chapter focus on the simulation of case 2 and case 4, because these two cases
are more common in practice.
In case 2, the impedance of each distribution line is set to 1 + 1j. In case 4,
the impedance of distribution line is changed, which is listed in Tab. A.1, so
that it violates the uniformed L/R ratio assumption. In both cases, the reactive
Table A.1: Impedance of distribution network in case 4
Vertex i Vertex j Resistance Inductance
1 2 0.5 1.5
2 3 0.5 1
1 4 1 1.5
2 5 1 1.5
5 6 0.5 1
2 7 0.5 1
3 8 0.5 1
3 9 1 1
power of each vertex are set to be unchanged, the active power of each vertex are
uniformly distributed from 9.9-10.1 MVA.
The correlation of the active power with different sizes of active power samples
is computed. The diagonal entries of ψ is shown in Fig.A.2. The reactive power of
each vertex is set to be constant. The simulation result is listed in Tab. A.2. The
partial graph representation of the identification results are show in Fig. A.3,Fig.
A.4 and Fig. A.5.
It can be observed that for the 30 size of sample voltage, if the L/R ratio is
uniformed, the distribution network could be identified. However, if the non-
uniformed L/R ratio assumption is violated, the distribution network couldn’t
be identified. As it was analyzed in case 4, the different result is caused by the
non-symmetric error ES.
It can also be observed that for both cases, when the sample size is increasing,
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Figure A.2: The value of diagonal entries of ψ with different sizes of active power
samples























Figure A.5: Identification result when voltage sample size is 100
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A.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, the modeling errors in the topology identification of radical dis-
tribution networks are analyzed. It is shown that if the measurement of voltage
is accurate enough, there are two factors that affects the result of identification:
the L/R ratio and the correlation of nodal injective power. The non-uniformed
L/R ratio would cause the non-symmetric error ES and the correlation of nodal
injective power would cause the correlation error EWψ. The impact of these two
errors were discussed separately and founded two cases that are common in prac-




More Simulation Results of
Primary Protection
B.1 LL Fault for Primary Protection
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(a) Magnitude of decomposed current from S1_1
(b) Magnitude of decomposed current from S1_2
(c) Magnitude of decomposed current from S1_3
Figure B.1: Magnitude of decomposed current from each individual current
sources to the distribution line with LL fault under different level of DER pene-
tration rate on bus 1
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(a) Angle of decomposed current from S1_1
(b) Angle of decomposed current from S1_2
(c) Angle of decomposed current from S1_3
Figure B.2: Angle of decomposed current from each individual current sources to
the distribution line with LL fault under different level of DER penetration rate
on bus 1
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(a) IL and the sum of decomposed current magnitude
(b) IL and the sum of decomposed current angle
Figure B.3: Comparison between IL and the sum of decomposed current of pri-
mary protection with LL fault under different level of DER penetration rate
Figure B.4: EMTP-MATLAB primary protection interface trip signal
171
B.2 LLG Fault for Primary Protection
(a) Magnitude of decomposed current from S1_1
(b) Magnitude of decomposed current from S1_2
(c) Magnitude of decomposed current from S1_3
Figure B.5: Magnitude of decomposed current from each individual current
sources to the distribution line with LLG fault under different level of DER
penetration rate on bus 1
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(a) Angle of decomposed current from S1_1
(b) Angle of decomposed current from S1_2
(c) Angle of decomposed current from S1_3
Figure B.6: Angle of decomposed current from each individual current sources
to the distribution line with LLG fault under different level of DER penetration
rate on bus 1
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(a) IL and the sum of decomposed current magnitude
(b) IL and the sum of decomposed current angle
Figure B.7: Comparison between IL and the sum of decomposed current of pri-
mary protection with LLG fault under different level of DER penetration rate
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Figure B.8: EMTP-MATLAB primary protection interface trip signal
B.3 LLL Fault for Primary Protection
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(a) Magnitude of decomposed current from S1_1
(b) Magnitude of decomposed current from S1_2
(c) Magnitude of decomposed current from S1_3
Figure B.9: Magnitude of decomposed current from each individual current
sources to the distribution line with LLL fault under different level of DER pen-
etration rate on bus 1
176
(a) Angle of decomposed current from S1_1
(b) Angle of decomposed current from S1_2
(c) Angle of decomposed current from S1_3
Figure B.10: Angle of decomposed current from each individual current sources
to the distribution line with LLL fault under different level of DER penetration
rate on bus 1
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(a) IL and the sum of decomposed current magnitude
(b) IL and the sum of decomposed current angle
Figure B.11: Comparison between IL and the sum of decomposed current of
primary protection with LLL fault under different level of DER penetration rate
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Figure B.12: EMTP-MATLAB primary protection interface trip signal
B.4 LLLG Fault for Primary Protection
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(a) Magnitude of decomposed current from S1_1
(b) Magnitude of decomposed current from S1_2
(c) Magnitude of decomposed current from S1_3
Figure B.13: Magnitude of decomposed current from each individual current
sources to the distribution line with LLLG fault under different level of DER
penetration rate on bus 1
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(a) Angle of decomposed current from S1_1
(b) Angle of decomposed current from S1_2
(c) Angle of decomposed current from S1_3
Figure B.14: Angle of decomposed current from each individual current sources
to the distribution line with LLLG fault under different level of DER penetration
rate on bus 1
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(a) IL and the sum of decomposed current magnitude
(b) IL and the sum of decomposed current angle
Figure B.15: Comparison between IL and the sum of decomposed current of
primary protection with LLLG fault under different level of DER penetration
rate
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Figure B.16: EMTP-MATLAB primary protection interface trip signal
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Appendix C
More Simulation Results of
Backup Protection





Figure C.1: Magnitude of decomposed current between current sources on bus 1






Figure C.2: Magnitude of decomposed current between current sources on bus 1






Figure C.3: Angle of decomposed current between current sources on bus 1 to






Figure C.4: Angle of decomposed current between current sources on bus 1 to
current source 2 on bus 2 with LL fault under different level of DER penetration
rate
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(a) Magnitude of IL and the sum of the decomposed current between
multiple current sources
(b) Angle of IL and the sum of the decomposed current between
multiple current sources
Figure C.5: Magnitude and angle of IL and the sum of the decomposed current
between multiple current sources
Figure C.6: EMTP-MATLAB backup protection interface trip signal
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Figure C.7: Magnitude of decomposed current between current sources on bus






Figure C.8: Magnitude of decomposed current between current sources on bus






Figure C.9: Angle of decomposed current between current sources on bus 1 to






Figure C.10: Angle of decomposed current between current sources on bus 1 to
current source 2 on bus 2 with LLG fault under different level of DER penetration
rate
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(a) Magnitude of IL and the sum of the decomposed current between
multiple current sources
(b) Angle of IL and the sum of the decomposed current between
multiple current sources
Figure C.11: Magnitude and angle of IL and the sum of the decomposed current
between multiple current sources
Figure C.12: EMTP-MATLAB backup protection interface trip signal
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Figure C.13: Magnitude of decomposed current between current sources on bus






Figure C.14: Magnitude of decomposed current between current sources on bus






Figure C.15: Angle of decomposed current between current sources on bus 1 to






Figure C.16: Angle of decomposed current between current sources on bus 1 to
current source 2 on bus 2 with LLL fault under different level of DER penetration
rate
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(a) Magnitude of IL and the sum of the decomposed current between
multiple current sources
(b) Angle of IL and the sum of the decomposed current between
multiple current sources
Figure C.17: Magnitude and angle of IL and the sum of the decomposed current
between multiple current sources
Figure C.18: EMTP-MATLAB backup protection interface trip signal
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Figure C.19: Magnitude of decomposed current between current sources on bus






Figure C.20: Magnitude of decomposed current between current sources on bus






Figure C.21: Angle of decomposed current between current sources on bus 1 to






Figure C.22: Angle of decomposed current between current sources on bus 1 to
current source 2 on bus 2 with LLLG fault under different level of DER penetra-
tion rate
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(a) Magnitude of IL and the sum of the decomposed current between
multiple current sources
(b) Angle of IL and the sum of the decomposed current between
multiple current sources
Figure C.23: Magnitude and angle of IL and the sum of the decomposed current
between multiple current sources





DER Distributed Energy Resource
DT Definite Time
EMS Energy Management System
EMTP Electromagnetic Transients Program
FCL Fault Current Limiter
IED Intelligent Electronic Device
IDMT Inverse Definite Minimum Time
INST Instantaneous








PMU Phasor Measurement Unit
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RMS Root Mean Square
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
TCC Time Current Curve
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